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Abstract
Essays on the Economics and Politics of Wildfire Management
by
Matthew J. Wibbenmeyer
In the past several decades, wildfires in the western U.S. have become more severe,
frequent, and damaging. Federal and state governments bear substantial responsibility
for managing these incidents. Yet we know little about how government environmental
managers make decisions, whether in this context, or in the many other contexts in which
government administrators play an important role. In this dissertation, I use the example
of federal wildfire management to study decision-making among government environmen-
tal managers. In the first essay, I estimate avoided losses to structures due to wildfire
suppression. Though preventing losses to structures is a primary goal of wildfire suppres-
sion, avoided losses to structures do not justify costs of suppression for many wildfires,
especially those that begin in remote areas. In the second and third essays, my collab-
orators and I explore consequences of behavioral biases among communities affected by
wildfire management. In the second essay, we show that, due to pressure individuals place
on government administrators, behavioral biases can affect the decision-making of public
land management agencies. In the empirical context of this study, government decisions
over where to locate wildfire risk reduction projects, this can result in inefficient policy
outcomes. The third and final essay uses behavioral bias-induced shocks to community
demands for wildfire risk reduction projects to study differences in responsiveness among
government administrators to demographically-varying communities. We find that gov-
ernment administrators are more responsive to communities in which a greater percentage
of residents are white, educated, or young.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past several decades, wildfires within the western U.S. have become increasingly
frequent, severe, and damaging. While this trend owes its explanation to a number of
factors (including climate change), an important contributing factor has been the legacy
of fire suppression on public lands in the western U.S. In the West, 69% of forest land,
and 49% of land overall, is publicly owned. Beginning in the early twentieth century,
land management agencies—led by the U.S. Forest Service—adopted a policy of fire
exclusion. In many western U.S. forest types, fire exclusion has led to an accumulation
of fuels, increasing the risk that ignitions develop into severe and hazardous wildfires.
Because of the federal government’s role in contributing to current conditions in western
forests, advocates for divestiture of public lands have cited the example of wildfire to
argue that the federal government is ill-prepared to manage its extensive landholdings
(e.g. Nelson, 2017).
Though government administration of the environment has come under particular
scrutiny in the case of western public lands and the management of wildfire, wildfire
management is far from the only context in which government plays a significant role in
managing the environment. It is therefore critical to understand how governments make
1
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decisions regarding environmental management. In general, economists either ignore
this question by assuming governments are welfare-optimizing “social planners,” or they
have adopted political economy approaches to address this question. Yet while political
economy approaches are well-suited to studying the formation of policy, outcomes may
frequently be driven by policy administration. In the case of federal land management,
bureaucratic land managers often have significant discretion in defining land (or wildfire)
management strategies.
This dissertation presents three self-contained essays that use the example of federal
wildfire management to study factors that affect decision-making among government en-
vironmental managers. In the first essay, I assess benefits of wildfire suppression in terms
of avoided losses to structures. We know very little about benefits of wildfire suppression,
in part because it is difficult to know how a fire would have spread in absence of suppres-
sion. To estimate benefits of wildfire suppression, I adopt a two-step strategy. In the first
step, I use a novel spatial duration model, historical fire perimeters, and outputs from a
state-of-the-art wildfire simulation tool to estimate the relative contributions of fire sup-
pression effort and physical factors to the probability a wildfire will be extinguished. In
the second step, estimates of the model are used to predict fire spread probabilities with
and without suppression effort, and I compute estimates of avoided structure losses due
to wildfire suppression based on these probabilities. While preventing losses to private
property is a primary goal of wildfire management, I find that avoided losses to structures
due to suppression are frequently substantially lower than suppression’s costs, especially
in the case of fires that begin in remote locations. Previous research has found that
wildfire managers are frequently highly risk averse. My results are consistent with these
findings, and suggest that in the case of wildfire management, government managers do
not effectively optimize expected social welfare from wildfire suppression.
In the second and third essays, my collaborators and I explore consequences of be-
2
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havioral biases among communities affected by wildfire management. While a large lit-
erature has studied the effects of behavioral biases on individual decision-making, in the
second essay, we show that behavioral biases can also affect the decision-making of public
agencies as well. In this essay, we focus on salience and government land management
agency decisions over where to locate wildfire risk reduction projects. Salience is a com-
mon behavioral bias whereby people’s attention is drawn to salient features of a decision
problem, leading them to overweight prominent information in subsequent judgments.
When agencies are influenced by public pressure, and when public risk perceptions are
biased, resources may be allocated toward locations where risk is most salient, not to
where those resources are most needed. We test whether salience increases or decreases
allocation of government projects to reduce wildfire severity near wildland-adjacent com-
munities. Even though the occurrence of a wildfire likely reduces the severity of future
fires in the same area, it may increase the likelihood that fuels management projects
are placed nearby if wildfire events strongly increase the salience of losses under future
fires. We find strong evidence that the salience effects increase the likelihood of fuels
management projects, and use robustness checks to eliminate competing explanations
for our results.
The third and final essay uses behavioral bias-induced shocks to community demands
for wildfire risk reduction projects to study differences in responsiveness to demographically-
varying communities among government administrators. In general, we tend to believe
that in a democratic system public participation in governmental decisions leads to bet-
ter outcomes. However, recent research (e.g. Gilens, 2005) has argued that when prefer-
ences vary across groups, and when policymakers are differentially responsive to different
groups, greater levels of responsiveness can lead to greater inequality. Focusing specifi-
cally on the case of wildfires and wildfire risk management in the western U.S., we find
that when communities experience nearby wildfire events, it raises the salience of wildfire
3
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risk and leads agencies to place a greater number of wildfire risk reduction projects nearby.
However, salience-based decision-making does not benefit all communities equally. We
find that nearby fires increase rates of fuel treatment particularly among whiter and more
highly educated communities. Although there is growing evidence of inequality in leg-
islative representation, this is the first evidence we know of showing that public agencies
perpetuate inequality, via the behavioral biases of the public.
1.1 Permissions and Attributions
Andrew Plantinga, Sarah Anderson, and Olivier Deschenes provided valuable guid-
ance in the work leading to chapter 2. Randy Walsh generously provided assessor’s data
used in the chapter. As well, in writing chapter 2, I benefited from the helpful com-
ments of Kyle Meng, Becky Epanchin-Niell, Max Moritz, Ryan Abman, Corey Lott, and
Maureen Kennedy, as well as seminar participants at the 2016 Association of Environ-
mental and Resource Economists Summer Meeting, the Heartland Environmental and
Resource Economics Workshop, the University of Colorado Environmental and Resource
Economics Workshop, and departmental seminars within the Department of Economics
at University of California, Santa Barbara. This work was supported by the NSF SEES
Hazards program, the National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, and the Earth
Research Institute at University of California, Santa Barbara.
Chapters 3 and 4 are the result of a collaboration with Andrew Plantinga and Sarah
Anderson, and were made possible through support of the NSF SEES Hazards pro-
gram and the National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center. In the course of writing
these chapters, we benefited from comments of seminar and session participants at Yale
University, the Paris School of Economics, the University of Maine, the University of
Ferrara, the University of Turin, the Department of Economics and the Bren School of
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Environmental Science and Management at University of California, Santa Barbara, the
Property and Environment Research Center, the American Political Science Association
2015 Annual Meeting, the Politics and Economics of Wildfire Conference, the 2016 As-
sociation of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Meeting, and the Ostrom
Workshop Program on Natural Resource Governance & Environmental Policy. Heather
Hodges, Naomi Tague, Maureen Kennedy, Max Moritz, Ryan Bart, and Charlie Diamond
provided helpful feedback. Maribeth Todd provided assistance assembling the GIS data.
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Chapter 2
Burning down the house: Wildfire
and the benefits of responses to
natural disasters
In recent years, the western U.S. and Canada have experienced a series of devastating
wildfire events, including the Rim Fire in Yosemite National Park in 2013, the Fort
McMurray wildfire in Alberta in 2016, and the devastating fires in Napa and Sonoma
counties in California in October 2017. These wildfires are part of a pattern of increasingly
frequent and severe wildfires in the region. Since the 1970s, wildfire frequency within the
western U.S. has increased by over 500%, while area burned has increased by over 1200%
(Westerling, 2016). As wildfires have become more pervasive, costs of managing them
have increased correspondingly. Annual U.S. federal spending on wildfire suppression has
approximately doubled in real terms over the past two decades (NIFC, 2017). In 2017,
federal spending on wildfire suppression reached $2 billion for the first time.1 While the
1For reference, annual U.S. spending on all natural disasters averaged $27.7 between 2005 and 2014
(US GAO, 2016)
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increase in wildfire spending has been especially dramatic, it parallels increases in federal
disaster spending overall over the past several decades (Lindsay and McCarthy, 2015).
As the cost of managing wildfires grows, it becomes increasingly important to allo-
cate responses to wildfires efficiently. The federal government—and in particular, the
U.S. Forest Service—plays a central role in wildfire management within the western U.S.
due to its extensive landholdings in the region and its role in funding state fire manage-
ment programs.2 In the early twentieth century, Forest Service policy required that all
fires be extinguished as quickly as possible. Eventually, science supporting an ecologi-
cally beneficial role of wildfire caused a shift in official federal policy toward wildfires.
However, while prescribed fire is now used in some cases to manage wildfire risk, and
there are occasional allowances that wildfires within very remote wilderness areas be
left to burn uncontrolled, aggressive suppression continues to dominate wildfire manage-
ment (Franklin and Agee, 2003). This program of suppression is controversial. There
is some evidence that wildfire managers are excessively risk averse in their responses to
fires (Wilson et al., 2011; Wibbenmeyer et al., 2013; Thompson, 2014), and that a policy
of indiscriminant wildfire suppression has eliminated potentially beneficial wildfires. In
order to target wildfire suppression more efficiently, it is important to understand its
costs and benefits, and how they vary across incidents. Yet we know very little about
the benefits of wildfire suppression.
In this paper, I evaluate an important economic benefit of wildfire suppression effort:
protection of private property. The benefits of responding to a natural disaster are
defined as avoided losses due to the response. Therefore, estimates of the benefits of
disaster response rely on an unobserved counterfactual: what would damages have been
in absence of disaster response? To identify benefits of wildfire suppression, I adopt a
2Approximately 70% of federal wildfire spending is appropriated to the USFS (Thompson et al.,
2015).
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two-step approach. In the first-step, I estimate the effect of wildfire suppression effort
on wildfire spread. In the second step, I conduct a counterfactual analysis in which I
predict wildfire outcomes with and without wildfire suppression effort. I estimate avoided
property losses due to suppression as the difference between estimated property losses
under the two scenarios.
Identifying the effects of effort on fire outcomes is challenging because the strength
with which government managers respond to a wildfire is expected to be endogenous to
the intensity of the fire. Complicating matters further, both the physical factors that
determine wildfire intensity and the effort that managers exert to suppress wildfires vary
over space and over the evolution of a wildfire incident. I respond to these challenges
in two ways. First, I adopt an explicitly spatial-dynamic approach to the estimation
of effects of suppression effort. To account for natural and physical factors that affect
fire spread, I make use of a fire simulation model developed by the U.S. Forest Service
and used in the management of wildfire incidents. The fire simulation model, known as
Minimum Travel Time (MTT), integrates spatial data as well as time-varying vegetation
and winds data into predictions regarding wildfire behavior on the landscape. To estimate
effects of wildfire suppression effort on fire spread, I condition on predictions of wildfire
behavior. This effectively allows me to estimate effects of effort by contrasting fire spread
across locations where wildfire behavior is similar, but effort is different.
In the counterfactual analysis, I find that avoided losses to private property vary
substantially among wildfires. In some cases, avoided losses to private property may be
hundreds of times the costs of suppression. On the other hand, there are many fires—
especially fires in remote areas—for which the avoided losses to private property do not
justify costs of suppression. Though there are both costs and benefits of suppression that
are unaccounted for in this analysis, I argue that this suggests we may be over-allocating
resources toward suppression of some remote wildfires.
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This paper is one of the first studies to estimate benefits of responses to natural
disasters, and is to my knowledge the first to focus on the benefits of mitigating natural
disasters. The literature on costs of natural disasters is quite large (for a complete
review see Field et al. 2012 or Kousky 2014). However, only recently have researchers
begun to explicitly estimate benefits of responses to natural disasters.3 Natural disaster
damages can be averted through actions taken before an event (I refer to these responses
as adaptation) or during (mitigation). In contrast to the few previous papers that have
studied benefits of disaster response, I focus specifically on benefits of disaster mitigation.
In particular, I focus on wildfire suppression, a form of disaster mitigation that affects the
evolution of a wildfire event. Although mitigation is not possible for all types of natural
disasters, it is not a unique feature of wildfire management. Other examples of disaster
mitigation include deployment of flood control infrastructure and the management of
disease outbreaks.
Wildfire suppression is a spatial-dynamic problem. This paper is among the first to
empirically examine management of spatial-dynamic resources in a way that explicitly
accounts for spatial-dynamics. Spatial-dynamic models are frequently intractable due to
their high-dimensionality; therefore, much of the previous literature on spatial-dynamic
resources has been theoretical in nature.4 In the first step of the analysis, I develop a spa-
tial duration model that accounts for the spatial-dynamic nature of wildfire management
in a straight-forward and tractable manner.
I proceed by providing some background on wildfires and wildfire management within
the western U.S. I then develop a simple model of wildfire management. This model is
useful for motivating the empirical spatial duration model used in the first step of the
3For example, Hsiang and Narita (2012) study the capacity of countries to adapt to hurricanes.
4Previous studies have developed theories of optimal harvesting within a spatially-connected fishery
(Costello and Polasky, 2008), optimal control of invasive species (Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012), and
optimal patterns of fuel management under wildfire risk (Konoshima et al., 2010)
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analysis. It also provides qualitative predictions regarding the factors that should affect
allocation of suppression effort. In section 2.3, I describe the methods used to estimate
avoided private property losses due to fire suppression. This includes a description of
the spatial duration model used to estimate the effect of effort on fire spread, as well a
description of the way estimates of this model are used to evaluate avoided losses. In
section 2.4, I describe the data used in the analysis, including data derived from USFS
fire simulation models. I then present results from the first step of the analysis, followed
by results from the counterfactual analysis. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of
implications of the results for wildfire management.
2.1 Background
Wildfires—defined as uncontrolled non-structure fires occurring within wildlands—
have increased in frequency and severity within in the western U.S. in recent years.
Wildfires cause a variety of damages. They damage and destroy private property in their
paths. For example, the northern California wildfires of October 2017 destroyed more
than 8,000 structures, causing more than $3 billion in insured losses. Occasionally, wild-
fires result in losses of human life among fire fighters or ordinary citizens. Other damages
result from the carbon dioxide and smoke emissions given off as wildfires burn. Carbon
dioxide released each year by fires is equivalent to approximately 40% of global annual
fossil fuel emissions (Van Der Werf et al., 2004). Though the majority of these emissions
come from tropical forest fires, emissions from fires in temperate zones are nonetheless
substantial; approximately 3-5% of California’s annual carbon emissions come from wild-
fires (Gonzalez et al., 2015). Wildfire emissions also have important implications for
human health. A large literature has evaluated the health effects of wildfire smoke and
has found, for example, that wildfire smoke leads to increases in local hospital admis-
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sions (Moeltner et al., 2013), increases in early-life mortality (Jayachandran, 2009), and
decreases in labor supply (Borgschulte et al., 2016).
Fires occur when heat, fuel, and oxygen—an assemblage known to fire scientists as the
fire triangle—combine in the proper proportions. Of these elements, most of the recent
increase in wildfire activity within the western U.S. can be attributed to increases, either
due to climate or management, in the availability of fire-ready fuels. In the western U.S.,
climate change has led to earlier spring snowmelt, longer growing seasons, and warmer
temperatures. Combined, these factors have encouraged growth of burnable fuels in
western forests (Westerling, 2016). Further, wildfire suppression within the western U.S.
has left the region’s forests laden with fire-ready fuels (Allen et al., 2002; Schoennagel
et al., 2004). Due to the build-up of fuels over time, ignitions are now more likely to
develop in large, potentially damaging wildfires.
Because of its extensive land-holdings in the western U.S.,5 the U.S. federal govern-
ment plays a central role in managing wildfire in the region. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, the primary goal of federal wildfire suppression efforts was conser-
vation of resources, primarily timber. In the 1930s, the USFS adopted the “10 a.m.”
rule, which instructed forest rangers to attempt to extinguish all fires by 10 a.m. on the
the morning following their ignition. Over the course of the twentieth century, scientific
research established the importance of wildfire within forest ecology. In the 1978, the
federal government established a policy of total fire management, which allowed some
prescribed burns (planned burns intended to reduce fuels) and “let burns” on public
lands.
Though current federal wildfire policy has been revised several times since 1978,
it now states that “Response to wildland fires is based on ecological, social and legal
consequences of the fire” (USDA and DOI, 2009). Managers are now expected to manage
5Federal lands comprise 47% of land in the western United States (Bui and Sanger-Katz, 2016).
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wildfires in consideration of the range of values they affect, including watershed values,
threatened and endangered species habitat, health impacts due to smoke, and other
possible damages. However, it has generally been politically difficult to reduce wildfire
suppression effort when private property is at-risk. In practice, wildfire managers’ efforts
are believed to be largely motivated by protection of homes and structures (USDA OIG,
2017; Gude et al., 2013; Gorte, 2013). Therefore, in many cases, wildfire suppresion policy
today is indistinguishable from that under the 10 a.m. policy; when private property is
at risk managers attempt to extinguish fires as quickly as possible.
Upon initially discovering a fire, fire managers will attempt to quickly extinguish it
in what is known as the “initial attack.” When fires escape managers’ initial attempts at
containment, they rely on three sets of tactics: direct attack, aerial attack, and indirect
attack (NWCG, 2017). Direct attack includes tactics in which managers directly apply
treatment to burning fuel. Direct attack tactics are typically used when fires are relatively
small, which enables firefighters to work close to burning material and physically smother
the flames, or apply water or chemical retardant. Aerial attack involves applying water
or chemical fire retardants from the air, using helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft. Finally,
indirect attack includes fire suppression activities that take place at some distance from
the perimeter of the actively burning fire. For example, fire managers frequently work
in advance of a fire’s spread to construct fuel breaks, areas where burnable material has
been removed in order to stop a fire’s spread. Fuel breaks can be constructed using hand
tools or heavy equipment, or by “backburning”, which involves setting fire to fuels in
the main fire’s path while wind conditions are favorable. Finally, fire managers can take
advantage of pre-existing fuel breaks, such as roads.
To guide their use of these tactics, fire managers rely on knowledge of fire behavior
and weather, as well as a series of sophisticated wildfire simulation software tools, such
as Farsite (Finney, 1998) and FSPro (Finney et al., 2011). Wildfire simulation models
12
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incorporate data on physical topography, data vegetation and fuels, and weather data.
Within a model of fire behavior, these data allow fire simulation models to predict how the
three elements of the fire triangle—heat, fuel, and oxygen—will come together to influence
wildfire spread. Fire simulation models can also predict important characteristics of
wildfire behavior, such as the rate of fire spread and the intensity (measured in heat loss
per unit time). These predictions help fire managers choose how to allocate resources in
order to achieve management objectives such as defense of private property.
2.2 Theory
This section develops a theoretical model of the decision problem facing fire managers
in order to motivate the empirical analysis of factors affecting fire spread. The theory
does this in two ways. First, it emphasizes the spatial-dynamic nature of the fire man-
ager’s problem, and the role that uncertainty plays. Fire spreads in multiple directions
over space and time, and an increased level of suppression effort does not guarantee a
fire’s extinction in a given direction-of-spread. Therefore, how managers allocate effort
across directions-of-spread will depend on the spatial distribution of at-risk assets, and
the manager’s assessment of the likelihood the fire will reach those assets if she is not
successful in stopping the fire at its current point-of-spread. Second, the model provides
an implicit policy function describing fire manager’s optimal allocation of suppression
effort, which motivates the specification of the empirical model developed in the next
section.
To begin, I allow to fire spread in multiple discrete directions, indexed by `, from
its ignition point. In order to avoid tracing fire spread across both distance and time, I
assume the fire burns at unit speed in all directions. Therefore, at time t = s, the fire
is distance s from its ignition point in each direction `, conditional on it not yet having
13
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been extinguished in that direction. Values-at-risk in location s` are described by the
vector xs`. If the fire burns to distance s in direction `, the fire destroys assets present
at that location, and fire managers lose utility u(xs`). Ignitable fuels at distance s in
direction ` are given by rs`. At each location s`, the probability the fire is extinguished is
a function of both fuels in that location and effort es` expended toward suppressing the
fire. Therefore, I write the probability the fire is extinguished at point s as λ(es`, rs`),
and assume λ(·) is decreasing in fuels, and increasing in effort. Additionally, I assume
that the marginal effect of effort on extinction probability is decreasing in fuels. The
fire manager allocates effort across directions-of-spread ` in order to minimize expected
losses across all directions. I define ys as a 1 × L vector of state variables, where L is
the total number of directions over which the fire can spread. Each element ys` of ys is
a binary variable equal to zero if the fire has not yet been extinguished in direction ` at
distance s. Therefore, the law of motion for each element of ys is:
ys+1,` =

0 with prob. 1− λ(es`, rs`) if ys` = 0
1 with prob. λ(es`, rs`) if ys` = 0
1 if ys` = 1
(2.1)
Managers are subject to a budget constraint, which says that they cannot expend more
than b¯ total effort over the course of the fire. The remaining budget at time s is denoted
bs and evolves according to bs+1 = bs−
∑L
`=1 c(zs`)es`, where b0 = b¯ and zs` is a vector of
location-specific characteristics that affect marginal costs of suppression at location s`.
I can now write the fire manager’s problem as a dynamic program in discrete time.
In each period s, the fire manager’s problem is to solve:
Vs(y`s, bs) = max
es
−
L∑
`=1
(1− y`s)u(xs`) + βEy
[
Vs+1(ys+1, bs+1)|es
]
(2.2)
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subject to equation 2.1, bs+1 ≥ 0, and the law of motion for bs. To solve this problem,
the manager will choose e∗s such that:
λe(e
∗
s`, rs`)E
[ ∂Vs+1
∂ys+1,`
(e∗s)
]
= c(zs`)E
[∂Vs+1
∂bs+1
]
(2.3)
for all directions `. Though it is not possible to find a closed-form analytic solution to
this problem, this condition nevertheless provides some intuition regarding managers’
optimal allocation of effort across directions. The condition says that managers should
choose effort to equate marginal benefits with marginal costs across all directions of
spread. The left-hand side of the condition represents marginal benefit of suppression.
Effort affects the continuation value Vs+1 through its effects on extinction probability and
expected avoided losses u(x`s). For directions of spread with greater assets, increasing
extinction probability before the fire reaches those assets may provide greater benefits.
However, because marginal effects of suppression effort on extinction probability are
decreasing in fuels r, the fire manager should also consider the landscape and allocate
effort across directions at appropriate and opportune moments. The right-hand side of
equation 2.3 represents marginal costs of suppression effort. Increases in effort draw down
the remaining budget and thus decrease the continuation value.
There are a number of ways this model abstracts from reality. In reality, managers can
take indirect actions such as building a fuel break in advance of a fire’s spread. While
the model explicitly allows managers to take action only at the fire’s current point of
spread, indirect attacks are considered implicitly by allowing managers to “save” against
their budget b. More significantly, the model requires that fires spread linearly over
independent “directions of spread.” In reality, fires spread stochastically across a two-
dimensional landscape. Unfortunately, realistically accounting for the non-linearity of
fire spread would yield a high-dimensional spatial-dynamic model. Theoretical solutions
15
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to such a model would be numerically as well as analytically intractable; empirically
evaluating such a model would be impractical. Simplifying the managers’ problem in
this way significantly reduces the dimensionality of the problem while retaining insight
regarding its spatial-dynamic nature.
2.3 Empirical model
2.3.1 Fire spread distance as duration
In order to estimate the effects of natural factors and wildfire manager suppression
effort on fire extinction probability, while accounting for the spatial-dynamic nature of
the fire manager’s decision problem described in section 2.2, I adapt methods from du-
ration analysis to a spatial setting. Consider a fire burning in a single direction along a
featureless line. At any point along the fire’s path of spread, there is some probability
that the fire will stop its spread. In the language of duration analysis, the fire “exits
the state.” Therefore, I draw a parallel between fire spread distances and durations and
apply tools from duration analysis. The extinction probability, or the probability a fire
is extinguished at distance s from its ignition point conditional on it not yet having been
extinguished, corresponds to a hazard rate. As in the theoretical model, I model the
extinction probability as depending on natural characteristics (rs) and fire suppression
effort (es), both of which vary over space. I then model effort as depending on the
characteristics of at-risk assets in the fire’s path and estimate how these factors affect
extinction probability.
I write the fire extinction probability as λ(s, es, rs; θ), where θ is a vector of param-
eters. Using standard derivations from duration analysis, the cdf of fire spread distance
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can be written:
F (s) = 1− exp [− ∫ s
0
λ(s, es, rs; θ)ds
]
. (2.4)
Since fires potentially spread in 360 degrees from their points of origin, I divide the
landscape around each ignition into L directions of spread, where directions of spread
are indexed by `. I then divide each direction of spread into distance intervals, where
each interval m defines a grid cell spanning the distance (am−1, am] for m = 1, . . . ,M . I
define ym as equal to 1 if the fire stops burning within am−1 and am kilometers from the
ignition point, and 0 otherwise. Each direction of spread is observed up until the interval
at which it stops burning, which is denoted M`, or until the maximum distance M . If
the fire continues to burn in direction ` upon reaching distance M , the fire-direction
observation is right-censored.
I apply grouped duration data methods (e.g. Sueyoshi, 1995) because my measure of
fire spread distance is observed within discrete distance intervals. Using equation 2.4,
the probability a fire is observed to stop burning within the interval (am−1, am] along
direction of spread ` can be written:
Pr(ym = 1|ym−1 = 0,m ≤M) = 1− exp
[− ∫ am
am−1
λ(s, es, rs; θ)ds
]
. (2.5)
Under the assumption that factors affecting extinction probability are constant within
interval m`, I define wm` to be a vector describing es and rs within the interval. I then
define αm(wm`; θ) = exp
[− ∫ am
am−1
λ(s, es, rs; θ)ds
]
, the probability a fire is halted within
(m − 1,m]. I assume that conditional on wm`, the probability the fire is extinguished
is independent across intervals within a single direction of spread. Then the likelihood
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function for a single fire-direction observation can be written:
L`(θ|M`) =
(
1− αm(wm`; θ)
)M`−1∏
m=1
αm(wm`; θ), (2.6)
where the first term represents the probability that the fire will stop burning within
interval M`, and the second term represents the probability the fire continues to burn
within each of the intervals prior to interval M`. Under the further assumption that
αm(wm`; θ) is independent across fires and directions of spread conditional on wm`, the
overall likelihood function over L directions of spread and K fires can be written:
L =
K∏
k=1
L∏
`=1
M∏`
m=1
(
1− αm(wm`; θ)
)ym`kαm(wm`; θ)(1−ym`k). (2.7)
This likelihood function is the same form as the likelihood function of a standard binary
response model, where the particular binary response model to be estimated will depend
on the specification of the probability λ(·) (Jenkins, 1995; Sueyoshi, 1995). Fire extinction
probabilities are not independent across directions-of-spread. For example, a fire that
spreads a great distance to the northeast is also more likely to spread a great distance
to the north-northeast. In section 2.3.3, I discuss how I test the model’s robustness to
non-independence among fire spread directions.
2.3.2 Specification of spread-distance model
In order to estimate equation 2.7, I assume extinction probability is of the form:
λ(s, es, rs; θ) = exp
(
em` + rm`
)
λ0(s) (2.8)
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where em` is a variable summarizing effort and rm` is a variable summarizing the effects
of landscape and weather conditions on extinction probability. That is, I assume that
the extinction probability takes the form of a standard proportional hazard model. In
allowing λ0 to vary in s, the proportional hazard model allows for duration dependence.
This is important in modeling fire spread distance because fires that grow large are more
likely to continue to burn. Letting γm = ln
∫ am
am−1
λvdv, and using equation 2.5, extinction
probability can be written:
αm(wm; θ) = exp
[
−
∫ am
am−1
exp(em` + rm` + γm) dv
]
≡ F(em` + rm` + γm). (2.9)
This is the cdf of the complementary log-log distribution, implying that a proportional
hazard model corresponds to an easily-estimated complementary log-log model. Distance-
interval fixed effects are captured by γm; therefore, I make no assumptions regarding the
form of duration dependence.
According to the theory developed in section 2.2, effort at a given location depends
on costs of suppression as well as the benefits. Benefits are a function of assets protected
by suppression, including assets at the fire’s current location and assets further in the di-
rection of spread that are protected by suppression of the fire at that location. Therefore,
I write effort as:
em` =
m¯∑
m=0
βmxm` − z′m`δ (2.10)
where benefits of suppression include “spatial leads” of assets-at-risk (xm`) up to m¯ cells
away and suppression costs are function of the vector zm` within cell m`. In the theory
developed in section 2.2, effort can depend on physical landscape factors rm` if λer is not
equal to zero. Therefore, I also test models that include spatial leads of natural factors
19
Burning down the house: Wildfire and the benefits of responses to natural disasters Chapter 2
affecting fire spread. Including leads for these variables does not influence results.
In order to account for the effects of physical factors on fire spread, I rely on simulated
variables derived from a USFS fire simulation model. These variables, rate of spread and
fire intensity, are summarized in the vector vm`. Rate of spread and fire intensity do not
necessarily contribute in to extinction probability in a linear way. For example, a low rate
of spread may only contribute to the probability a fire stops spreading only when rate of
spread is very low. Therefore, I allow vm` to influence the complementary log-log index
function through the non-linear function g(·). In summary, I specify the complementary
log-log distribution I estimate as:
F
( m¯∑
m=0
βmxm` − z′m`δ + g(vm`) + γm
)
. (2.11)
2.3.3 Identification & Inference
The key identifying assumption in this paper is that, after controlling for observed
natural factors that affect fire spread, random factors that affect fire spread are uncorre-
lated with effort. A threat to identification would exist if there were omitted factors that
affected extinction probability and were correlated with effort. For example, population
density within an interval might be correlated with an area’s tendency to burn, even after
controlling for natural factors. Therefore, identification of the effects of assets-at-risk on
suppression effort rests in large part on how well simulated rate of spread accounts for
the landscape’s tendency to burn.
As indicated above, the assumption that extinction probabilities are independent
across directions of spread is likely false. Derivation of equation 2.7 requires the inde-
pendence assumption, therefore violations of independence may bias both coefficient and
standard error estimates. I adopt several strategies to test the sensitivity of results to
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violations of this assumption. First, I estimate the model using a linear probability and
compare the resulting coefficient estimates to marginal effects from equation 2.11. Since
predicted probabilities from the linear probability model may fall outside the 0,1 inter-
val, and ultimately I will use the estimated model to predict fire spread probabilities, the
LPM is not a satisfactory alternative to equation 2.11. However, comparing coefficients
from the LPM to marginal effects estimated from equation 2.11 provides a test of the
results’ sensitivity to violations of the independence assumption. Correlation in spread
distances among spread directions should decrease as the number of directions of spread
within each fire is reduced. Therefore, as a second test, I vary the number of directions
of spread L within each fire and test how results depend on how finely the data are
partitioned. Third, in my preferred specification of equation 2.9 I include fire-specific
fixed effects. Fixed effects account for a specific form of non-independence in probabil-
ity of extinction across fires—when fixed differences exist in probabilities of extinction
across fires. Finally, to ensure appropriate inference under violations of the independence
assumption, I cluster standard errors by fire (Cameron and Miller, 2010).
2.3.4 Counterfactual analysis
I use results from the estimation described above to estimate benefits of wildfire
suppression. Benefits of wildfire suppression are equal to the difference between expected
losses under the current suppression regime and expected losses under a regime with no
suppression. Letting ψ` represent the benefits of wildfire suppression within direction `,
this quantity can be calculated as:
E(ψ`) =
M∑
m=1
(
piNm`µ
N − piSm`µS
)× hm`,
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Burning down the house: Wildfire and the benefits of responses to natural disasters Chapter 2
where piSm` and pi
N
m` represent the probability that fire reaches cell m`, with and without
suppression respectively and hm` denotes the total value of structures within the cell.
The parameters µ represent the fraction of total structure value that is expected to be
lost conditional on fire reaching the cell. Since some portion of fire suppression effort may
be allocated to directly defending structures, µ is allowed to vary by suppression regime
so that µS represents the rate of structure loss under the current suppression regime and
µN represents the rate of loss under no suppression.
Estimates of equation 2.11 can be used to calculate fitted probabilities that fire will
reach each cell. Under the current wildfire suppression regime, the expected probability
with which fire will reach each cell m` can be written:
pˆiNm` = 1− F
(
eˆm` + g(̂vm`) + γˆm
)
(2.12)
where:
eˆm` =
m¯∑
m=0
x′m`βˆ
m − z′m`δˆ (2.13)
Under a zero suppression effort regime, the probability fire reaches cell m` can be written:
pˆiSm` = 1− F
(
g(̂vm`) + γˆm
)
. (2.14)
Using these estimated probabilities, I construct the following estimator for benefits of
suppression within direction of spread `:
ψˆ` =
M∑
m=1
(
pˆiNm`µ
Nhm` − pˆiSm`µShm`
)
. (2.15)
When hm` and the parameters µ are known, this estimator can be used to calculate the
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expected benefits of fire suppression for fires within the sample. This benefit can be
compared to costs of fire management to assess the net benefits of fire suppression.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Spread-distance model data
To estimate the model of fire spread-distance, I use three primary categories of data:
data describing fires and ignition locations, data describing determinants of fire suppres-
sion effort, and data describing natural factors that affect fire spread. Data describing
areas burned come from the Monitoring Trends in Burn Severity (MTBS) project (MTBS,
2014). Since 1984, the MTBS has used Landsat satellite imagery to map the geographic
extent of all fires greater than 1000-acres in size in the western U.S. It is possible that the
availability of only relatively large wildfires induces selection bias. Wildfires may fail to
reach the 1000-acre threshold for inclusion in the MTBS data set because they are more
responsive to suppression, or because they are relatively weak. If included fires are dis-
proportionately non-responsive to suppression, then the estimated effect of suppression
may be biased downward. Nonetheless, the estimated effect of suppression can be viewed
as a local average effect of effort among fires that escape initial containment and grow to
be greater than 1000 acres. Because I estimate benefits of suppression only for fires that
reach the 1000-acre threshold, I may omit fires for which suppression is most worthwhile
(for example, if costs of suppression are substantially smaller on small wildfires). If so,
the true distribution of net benefits may include a greater number of fires for which fire
suppression is worthwhile. But though the estimated distribution of net benefits from
fire suppression will be biased, the estimated net benefits from any individual wildfire
will not be biased.
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Ignition locations are due to Short (2017), who compiled a comprehensive database of
wildfires within the U.S. from 1993-2015 using a variety of federal, state, and local sources.
Fires within the database include coordinates of each fire’s point of origin to within 1
km. Short (2017) includes even small ignitions that never grew to be threatening fires.
I restrict my attention only to the set of fires large enough (generally greater than 1000
acres) to be mapped by MTBS. Further, I focus on fires whose ignitions were within 10
km of wildland urban interface, as mapped by Radeloff et al. (2005),6 and which occurred
in the western U.S. in years 1999- 2015. I restrict the sample to fires near wildland urban
interface areas because I am interested in benefits of fire suppression, which should be
largest for these fires. I focus on the western U.S. because wildfire hazard is a significant
concern in the region, and because fire regimes in the western U.S. are distinct from
those in the east. Under these restrictions, the sample contains 2,119 fires, the locations
of which are displayed in Figure 2.1.
To adapt the empirical model from the previous section to the data, I divide the
area surrounding each wildfire ignition point into L directions of spread. An example
is provided in Figure 2.2. In the primary set of results, L is equal to 24, and each
direction of spread has an angle of 15 degrees, though I check robustness of my results
to varying values of L. I further divide each direction of spread into a series of 1 km
distance intervals, up to a maximum distance (M) of 20 km, creating a circular grid
surrounding each ignition location. I overlay the circular grid with the corresponding
wildfire perimeter and code the fire as being extinguished (ym` = 1) within a cell if fire
fails to reach the centroid of the next cell. All prior cells (those nearer to the ignition
point) within the direction of spread are coded as burnt (ym` = 0).
7 I refer to the distance
6Wildland urban interface areas are those where developed residential areas intermingle with or are
directly adjacent to large areas of wildland vegetation (US Department of Agriculture and Department
of Interior, 2001).
7Coding intervals as burnt if the fire burns any portion of the interval does not substantively change
results.
24
Burning down the house: Wildfire and the benefits of responses to natural disasters Chapter 2
Figure 2.1: Geographic distribution of fires within the sample
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interval at which the fire is first extinguished within each direction as interval M`, and
I drop all observations within each direction ` for which m > M`. Fires sometimes
spread in irregular non-convex patterns, and they may return to a direction of spread
from which they have previously been extinguished. I ignore such cases and treat fires
as remaining extinguished once they have first been extinguished within a direction of
spread.8 Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of fire spread distances. For approximately
85% of spread-directions, fires are extinguished within 5 km of the ignition point. Fewer
8An alternative would be to code y`m as 0 until the cell within direction ` from which the fire is
extinguished for the final time. Applying this alternative coding scheme does not substantively change
results.
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Figure 2.2: Illustration describing the construction of the data set
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than 1% of spread-directions are censored by the maximum distance of 20 km.
Fire suppression is a function of at-risk assets within a given direction of spread, and
of costs of suppression. To account for variation in suppression effort due to popula-
tions at risk, I use U.S. Census data collected at the block and tract-level. Population
and housing variables are available for the 2000 and 2010 censuses at the block level.
Other demographic variables, including income and education variables, are available
only at the Census tract-level. To map Census block-level and tract-level data to the
circular grids surrounding each ignition point, I assume that populations are uniformly
distributed within each Census block, and that Census blocks are demographically uni-
form within each tract. Because I lack data on home values for the 1999-2015 sample of
26
Burning down the house: Wildfire and the benefits of responses to natural disasters Chapter 2
Figure 2.3: Histogram of fire spread distances
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fires throughout the western U.S., I rely on Census per capita income data to provide
a proxy for home values. As can easily be seen in Figure 2.2, circular grid cells vary in
area. The increase in affected area as fire spreads away from its point of origin captures a
natural feature of spatial dynamic phenomena; spread may be more damaging, and more
costly to control, as it proceeds and the perimeter of the affected area expands (Epanchin-
Niell and Wilen, 2012). Consistent with this feature of fire spread, I use area-dependent
measures to capture both benefits and costs of controlling fire within a grid cell. To
proxy for the number of homes in a cell, I use population density. As a measure of the
total value of homes within each cell, I use population multiplied by per-capita income,
which I refer to as “total income.” To allow that fire managers may undertake greater
suppression effort on behalf of higher income residents, I also per capita income. In its
first panel, Table 2.1 summarizes demographic characteristics by distance from ignition
point. There is a clear trend in population density (as well as total income) over distance
from the ignition point. This is likely due to selection; a fire is more likely to grow to be
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for circular grid cell-level observations, by distance
from fire ignition point
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0-5 km
5-10
km
10-15
km
15-20
km
Whole
sample
Demographic vars.
Total population 8.38 40.3 80.9 132 65.2
Population density (persons/sq. km) 34 63.9 77.2 90.3 66.2
Total income (2009 USD thousands) 181 807 1,651 2,612 1,309
Per capita income (2009 USD
thousands)
23.3 23.3 23.3 23.2 23.3
Percent high school graduate 80.1 80.2 80.1 80.1 80.1
Percent college graduate 18 18 17.9 17.9 17.9
Other values at risk
Contains major road .0604 .0987 .138 .169 .116
Avg. watershed importance rating
(0-100)
31.9 31.8 31.7 31.5 31.7
Percent TES habitat (non-stream) 13.4 11.9 11.1 10.7 11.8
Percent within 0.5 km of TES
habitat (stream)
3.83 3.5 3.33 3.28 3.48
Cost vars.
Percent within 0.5 km of roads 56.9 58 57.5 57 57.3
Avg. topographic ruggedness index 21.6 19.6 19.2 18.6 19.7
Fire spread vars.
Simulated rate of fire spread
(chains/hour)
1.72 1.6 1.54 1.5 1.59
Simulated fire intensity (kW/hour) 270 298 293 285 287
Number of obs. 219,933 219,192 218,345 217,421 874,891
Note: TES refers to threatened and endangered species.
large, and therefore be included in the sample, if it begins in a more rural location. This
suggests that, in estimating the effect of population on extinction probability, controlling
for distance from ignition may be important to account for secular trends in demographic
characteristics as well as to control for effects of duration dependence.
Though protection of private property is a primary concern of fire managers, they
may also be concerned with protecting a variety of other assets, including watersheds,
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threatened and endangered species habitat, and roads. An important management ob-
jective of forest managers is to protect watershed values. Fires can impact watersheds by
increasing runoff and reducing water storage. I measure the watershed value of each cell
by multiplying its area by a spatially-weighted average of its watershed significance, based
on a 0-100 rating provided by USDA (2017). To control for the influence of threatened
and endangered species habitat on suppression effort, I construct two measures using
geospatial data describing locations of critical habitat (USFWS, 2017). I measure the
area within each cell classified as critical habitat for terrestrial species, and I measure
the area within each each cell that is within 0.5 km from riparian species. Fire managers
may be averse to closing major roads due to fire. Therefore, I construct an indicator
variable describing whether a primary or secondary road crosses each cell.9
To account for differences in the cost of fire suppression over space, I collect data
on accessibility and topographic ruggedness. Accessibility is measured as area within
each cell that is within 0.5 km of a road. I measure costs associated with ruggedness
by calculating the average topographic ruggedness index (TRI) within each cell using 30
m resolution digital elevation model (DEM), and multiplying average TRI by the cell’s
area. TRI measures the variation in elevation among a pixel and its neighbors (Riley,
1999; Nunn and Puga, 2012). Another important factor affecting cost of effort is the
availability of personnel and equipment resources. Among the models I estimate in the
next section are models including fire-level fixed effects. Fire-level fixed effects should
account for differences in availability of resources, since availability of resources generally
should be same within a given fire.
Finally, I control for natural factors affecting fire spread through inclusion of outputs
from a model of fire spread. The USFS has developed a variety of fire simulation software
9Primary roads are defined as divided, limited access state highways or interstate highways. Secondary
roads are other highways belonging to the U.S. highway, state highway, or county highway systems.
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(including Farsite, Flammap, and FSPro), each of which varies in its applications within
fire management. To simulate fire spread, I use the Minimum Travel Time (MTT) model,
which is the foundational fire simulation model underlying a variety of these programs,
including Flammap and FSPro. Rather than explicitly predicting how a fire perimeter
will expands over the landscape, MTT calculates the minimum travel time necessary for
fire to travel among a two-dimensional network of nodes across the landscape. From
these travel times, it interpolates fire arrival times. A key advantage of MTT is that
it approximates more accurate models of fire behavior in exchange for relatively low
computational cost (Finney, 2002). MTT takes as inputs features of the landscape such
as elevation, slope, and aspect, as well as characteristics of vegetation on the landscape.
An MTT simulation also includes as input a guess as to initial fuel moisture conditions
(the model then allows fuel moistures to evolve over the course of the fire) and a wind
direction and wind speed. Topographic data and time-varying vegetation and fuels data
were collected from the Landfire project (Landfire, 2014), which provides remotely-sensed
landscape data at a 30 m resolution.10 I collected observed wind speed and wind direction
at the time of each ignition from its closest Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS
station).
I simulated fire spread for each of the 2,119 wildfires in my sample. Rather than limit
the duration of each simulated fire, I allowed each fire to entirely consume the landscape
within 20 kilometers of its ignition point. Allowing the landscape to be entirely con-
sumed by fire generates a series of landscape-wide measures describing how fire would be
expected to burn within a given pixel, conditional on reaching that pixel. I use simulated
10Vegetation characteristics comprise canopy cover, canopy height, canopy base height, canopy bulk
density, and fuel models, which describe characteristics of fuels and how they respond to fire. Landfire
collects vegetation characteristics from remote sensing data with a resolution of 30 m. Since 2008,
Landfire vegetation data have been updated every two years, but Landfire was not updated between
2000 and 2008. I use 2000 Landfire data for years 2000-2005, 2008 data for years 2006-2010, and 2010,
2012, and 2014 data for the two years following each of those updates.
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of fire simulation output
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fire intensity and simulated rate of spread as predictors of fire extinction probability. Fire
intensity measures the rate at which energy is released due to the consumption of fuels.
High intensity is characteristic of hot fires that burn in the upper canopy of the a forest,
whereas low intensity fires frequently burn on grasslands or within the forest understory.
Rate of spread measures the speed at which a fire’s flaming front moves across the land-
scape. An example output from MTT is provided in panel A of figure 2.4. Darker pixels
correspond to locations where fire is expected to spread more rapidly. Panel B illustrates
that MTT outputs are averaged over circular grid cells to yield a grid-cell level measure
of rate of spread.
In its lower panels, Table 2.1 summarizes how non-demographic values-at-risk, cost,
and fire spread variables vary with distance from the ignition point. To better illustrate
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trends in distance from the ignition point, the table includes per area measures of these
variables. Watershed importance and amount of endangered species habitat tends to
decrease with distance from the ignition point, but prevalence of major roads increases.
As distance from the ignition point increases, fires are expected to burn more slowly and
cost of suppression becomes lower.
2.4.2 Counterfactual analysis data
To apply spread-distance model results to the estimation of benefits of fire suppres-
sion, hm`, µ
N , and µS must be known. To estimate these variables I draw on two addi-
tional sources of data. The value of structures within each grid cell is based on property-
level county assessor’s data from CoreLogic, Inc. for the entire state of California in years
2010 and 2011.11 I overlay the property-level data set against each fire’s circular grid,
and I calculate the sum total of assessed structure values within each cell.12 Property
values may quite likely be influenced by the occurrence of a fire. In order to ensure that
property value estimates are not affected by fires in my sample, I focus on fires occurring
after 2011. As well, data on costs of suppression and structures destroyed are not avail-
able for 2014 and 2015. Therefore, I focus on estimating benefits of wildfire suppression
for 47 fires occurring in California between 2012-2013.
Because not all structures within the boundary of a wildfire are destroyed, I estimate
the fraction of structure value lost conditional on fire burning the cell (the parameters
µ). I collect the number of structures within each wildfire perimeter and the number
of structures destroyed for each of the 2012-2015 California wildfires. The number of
structures destroyed comes from situation reports (SIT-209 reports) submitted to the
11These data were generously provided by Randy Walsh and are used under an agreement with Duke
University Department of Economics.
12Structure values for each property are calculated as the difference between estimated property value
and assessed land values
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interagency Incident Command System, which coordinates allocation of fire management
resources across incidents. Situation reports frequently, but not always, include estimates
of the number of structures destroyed on a given fire. I use these numbers, with the
number of properties falling inside each wildfire perimeter, to construct a fraction of
structure value within the perimeter that is destroyed. This fraction provides an estimate
of µS, the rate of structure value loss under the current suppression regime. The rate
of structure loss under no suppression loss is not observed, therefore I calculate net
benefits for various value of µN . First, I assume that under no suppression, structure
value is lost at the same rate it is lost in the current suppression regime. This likely
underestimates the value of structures that would be lost under no suppression, since
some suppression resources may be used to directly defend structures. An alternate
assumption is that 100% of structure value within burnt cells is destroyed by fire. This
is likely an overestimate of losses but provides an upper bound for estimates of lost
structure value under no suppression. To assess whether avoided structure losses justify
costs of suppression, I use suppression cost estimates, which are also drawn from wildfire
situation reports.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Spread-distance model results
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide estimates of the effects of suppression effort and natural fire
spread variables, respectively, on extinction probability. For variables associated with fire
suppression effort, I report marginal effects calculated at the means of the explanatory
variables. Fire managers are assumed to consider assets at risk up to 3 km in advance of
a fire’s current point of spread; however, second and third spatial leads are, in general,
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not statistically significant from zero and so they are omitted from the table. This could
be evidence that, in spite of the model developed in section 2.2, managers are relatively
short-sighted and only consider assets that are relatively directly in a fire’s path. Another
possible interpretation is that production of extinction probability is convex in effort; for
example, partially constructed fire breaks may be ineffective. In this case, fire managers
might focus their attentions and effort constructing fire breaks just ahead of important
assets in the fire’s path. A third possible interpretation of this result is that beyond the
first lag, spread directions are not accurate reflections of where managers believe fires
will spread. The paper’s empirical strategy imposes a significant amount of structure on
patterns of fire spread. Fire managers may have beliefs about where fires will spread that
are not reflected in the linear directions-of-spread. Future work could use fire simulation
models to develop landscape-based directions-of-spread.
Column 1 of Table 2.2 omits fire spread controls and estimates fire extinction proba-
bility as a function only of assets at-risk. Column 2 adds fire spread controls, and column
3 adds fire fixed effects. Fire fixed effects control for fixed differences in extinction prob-
ability within directions-of-spread and across fires. For example, fire fixed effects might
control for unobserved differences in suppression costs across fires. They may also help
control for unobserved differences in fuel moisture (which affects how readily vegetation
will burn) due to the time of year and precipitation. Within column 3, the preferred
specification, a variety of suppression effort variables are significantly different from zero
in the focal cell or the first spatial lead. Marginal effects for explanatory variables within
the focal cell indicate variables’ marginal effect on the probability fire will stop spreading
before it reaches the centroid of the next cell within the direction of spread. For example,
when fire reaches the centroid of a populated cell, it is 3.3 percentage points more likely
to stop burning before it reaches the next cell’s centroid than it would have been within
an unpopulated cell. First spatial leads reflect the marginal effect explanatory variables
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within the next cell in a given direction-of-spread have on the probability fire will stop
spreading before it reaches the centroid of the next cell. This explains why in some cases
the first spatial lead has a marginal effect with greater statistical significance or greater
magnitude. Focal cells where fires are extinguished may frequently be majority burnt;
at the very least, their centroid is burnt. In contrast, spatial leads of cells in which fires
are extinguished have unburnt centroids.
In general, marginal effects within Table 2.2 accord with expectations. Fires are 6.7
percentage points more likely to be extinguished when they are burning toward popu-
lated grid cells. When population within the leading cell further increases by 100, the
probability the fire will be extinguished increases by 4.4 percentage points. Increases in
population density by 1 person per square kilometer within focal and leading grid cells are
associated with 0.01 percentage point increases in extinction probability. Interestingly,
both total income and per capita income have no discernable effect on probability of
extinction. Indeed, if anything, increases in income are associated with decreases in the
probability of fire extinction. These results imply that fire managers do not preferentially
protect higher income areas or areas where the value the total value of the housing stock
is greater. Rather, it appears that effort is largely motivated by preventing fire from
spreading into populated areas. Fires are also substantially more likely to stop spreading
before they reach cells containing major roads. While this large coefficient may reflect
managerial aversion to closing major roadways, it is also possible that roadways provide
a fire break that is not adequately captured by the fire spread model. Therefore, I have
tested the sensitivity of counterfactual analysis results to the inclusion of the major road
indicator within the vector of variables determining effort. Excluding the major road
indicator from the effort vector does not substantively change the results of the couter-
factual analysis. They are also more likely to stop burning as they approach riparian
threatened and endangered species habitat, though they are somewhat less likely to stop
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burning prior to reaching non-stream sensitive habitat. Watershed importance appears
to have no effect on probability of extinction. Of the two cost variables, only the per-
centage of the cell near road is statistically significant in the preferred specification. Fire
is 2.9 percentage points more likely to be extinguished within cells with 10 percentage
points more area within 0.5 km of a road.
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.2, I control for effects of physical factors (landscape,
fuels, etc.) on fire spread by allowing fire simulation outputs (rate of spread and fire
intensity) to each affect the complementary log-log index function in a cubic function.
This is to allow for the fact that the effect these variables have on probability of extinction
may vary depending on their value. Since it would not be meaningful to report separate
marginal effects for the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms for each polynomial, I instead
report coefficients within Table 2.3. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.3 report polynomial
coefficients for fire spread variables from the regressions in column 2 and 3 of Table 2.2,
respectively. For the preferred specification, each of the polynomial coefficients is strongly
significant. This indicates that rate of spread and fire intensity have significant effects on
probability of extinction, and that these effects depend on the value of those variables.
For the range of values in the sample, simulated rate of spread has a negative effect on
probability of extinction, and simulated fire intensity has a positive effect on probability
of extinction. The effect of simulated rate of spread is of the expected sign. As shown
in Figure 2.4, simulated rate of spread is low within developed areas or areas with no
vegetation; therefore, the negative effect of rate of spread on probability of extinction
indicates that the variable is appropriately capturing the effects of fuels on extinction
probabilities. On the other hand, the marginal effect of intensity on extinction probability
is not negative, as would be expected. The positive effect of intensity on fire extinction
may capture the fact that fires tend to stop their spread on ridgelines, where fire intensity
tends to be high (Moritz, 2017).
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As discussed in section 2.3, the empirical model is based on an assumption that
spread-distances are independent across directions-of-spread within fires. Since this as-
sumption is likely false, I provide a series of tests of robustness checks intended to test
whether results depend on this assumption. First, I estimate the corresponding model
using a linear probability model. Unbiasedness of OLS does not depend on indepen-
dence among observations, therefore this provides a test for whether violations of the
independence assumption bias estimates reported in Table 2.2. Results from the linear
probability model are reported in column 1 of Table 2.4. Coefficients are very similar to
marginal effects from the preferred specification, indicating that violations of the inde-
pendence assumption do not strongly influence results. In columns 2 and 3, Table 2.4
reports estimates of equation 2.11 using logit and probit models, respectively. These
models test sensitivity of results to the specification of the hazard function, since it is
the choice of an exponential proportional hazard model that implies the complementary
log-log distribution. Results are not sensitive to the choice of binary response model.
Since the correlation between directions of spread should decrease as the number of
directions of spread within each fire decreases, I also test the sensitivity of results to
varying the number of directions-of-spread that surround each fire ignition. In Table 2.5,
I report marginal effects for explanatory effort variables when the data set is constructed
with 48, 12, and 6 directions-of-spread for each fire. The number of directions can be
increased or decreased from the number (24) used in the preferred specification with-
out substantially altering results. If the number of directions-of-spread is sufficiently
small, some results become statistically insignifcant—in part because the the number of
observations decreases with the number of directions. Even in this case though, signs
and magnitudes of coefficients remain broadly similar, providing additional evidence that
results are robust to violations of the independence assumption.
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2.5.2 Counterfactual analysis results
Using the full sample of fires across the western U.S., I calculate fitted fire spread
probabilities using equations 2.14 and 2.12, and coefficients from column 3 of Table 2.2.
These probabilities are used to predict fire spread distances with and without fire sup-
pression. Before proceeding to the counterfactual analysis, I use these probabilities to
predict fire spread distances for each of the fires in the western U.S. sample. I predict fire
spread with and without suppression 1,000 times for each fire. Figure 2.5 shows a ker-
nel density plot of the distributions of simulated fire spread distances with and without
suppression, plotted against the observed distribution of fire spread distance within the
sample. The distribution of predicted fire spread distances under suppression matches
the observed distribution of fire spread distances precisely, which indicates the model fits
the data well. When fires are not suppressed, I predict they spread further on average.
While most fires are extinguished quickly, the number of far-spreading fires is greater
when fires are not suppressed. The counterfactual analysis studies the degree to which
this difference is economically meaningful, and the degree to which it justifies suppression
spending.
Table 2.6 summarizes net benefits, calculated as estimated benefits from equation 2.15
less estimated costs of suppression from wildfire situation reports, for 47 California wild-
fires in years 2012 and 2013. Net benefits are calculated using three alternative loss rates
within unsuppressed fires: the observed sample loss rate (0.04), 0.5, and 1. Even when
the loss rate is assumed to equal 1, median net benefits are negative. However, the dis-
tribution is highly skewed with some fires having very high net benefits of suppression.
Assuming a loss rate of 1, suppression on one fire within the sample is estimated to have
yielded benefits of greater than $2 billion. Figure 2.6 illustrates the distribution of the
log of net losses and benefits under an the observed sample loss rate and a loss rate of 1.
38
Burning down the house: Wildfire and the benefits of responses to natural disasters Chapter 2
Figure 2.5: Kernel density plot of the distribution of fire spread distances for observed
and predicted fires. Kernel density functions are Epanechnikov with a 1.5 km band-
width. Fire spread distances predictions were repeated 1,000 times for each fire in the
sample.
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Figures 2.7 and 2.8 illustrate the geographic distributions of net loss and net benefit
fires, with unsuppressed fires causing structure losses at the observed sample loss rate
and a rate of 1, respectively. The magnitudes of net losses and benefits are shown
against the locations of major California cities, as well as wildland urban interface areas
within California. In general, fires for which suppression generates net benefits appear to
be more likely to be located closer to urban areas or extensive wildland urban interface
areas. In contrast, fires for which suppression generates large net losses tend to be located
in remote areas.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of net benefits and losses of fire suppression, estimated for
the sample average loss rate and a loss rate of 1.
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2.6 Discussion
In this paper, I find that the net benefits of wildfire suppression, in terms of avoided
losses to structures, vary widely across wildfires. While on some fires suppression is
associated with very large net benefits, avoided losses to structures are not sufficient to
justify suppression expenditure for many wildfires, especially those that begin in remote
locations. This analysis is limited somewhat by the range of values for which I estimate
benefits of suppression. I focus on avoided losses to structures, since protection of private
property is a primary motivator of wildfire suppression effort (USDA OIG, 2017; Gude
et al., 2013; Gorte, 2013). However, it is likely that the measure of structure value I use
does not fully capture avoided private property losses due to suppression. In addition to
damaging structures, wildfires can destroy their contents, as well as vehicles and other
equipment stored on-site. Wildfire may also reduce the land value associated with a
property due to reduced amenity values (Loomis, 2004; Stetler et al., 2010).
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Figure 2.7: Geographic distribution of net benefits and net losses of fire suppresion,
estimated using the sample average loss rate for unsuppressed fires
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Furthermore, wildfire can have important effects on health outcomes and carbon
emissions. Wildfire smoke has been shown to increase hospital emissions (Moeltner et al.,
2013), as well as to have substantial negative consequences for labor supply (Borgschulte
et al., 2016). Carbon effects may also be substantial. Over the past 10 years, fires have
burnt on average 6.8 million acres within the U.S. each year (NIFC, 2016). Environment
Canada estimates that wildfires within primarily coniferous ecosystems release 4.8 metric
tons of carbon per acre burned. Using the EPA’s current social cost of carbon of $36 per
metric ton, this implies that costs of carbon released in U.S. wildfires is approximately
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Figure 2.8: Geographic distribution of net benefits and net losses of fire suppresion,
estimated using a loss rate of 1 for unsuppressed fires
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$1.2 billion per year. If these additional benefits of wildfire suppression were included in
the static analysis of costs and benefits of wildfire suppression in this paper, it is likely
that suppression would be found to yield net benefits for a greater number of fires.
On the other hand, there is a large class of costs this paper excludes as well. While
this paper treats the management of an individual wildfire as a spatial dynamic problem,
it does not consider the effect wildfire management has on the management and outcomes
of future wildfires. Although understanding benefits of wildfire suppression in a static
setting is an important first step, the dynamic consequences of wildfire suppression are
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a significant omission that future work will need to address. Two dynamic consequences
are particularly of note. First, government suppression of wildfire provides a subsidy
to homeowners who choose to live in relatively risky locations. More aggressive wildfire
suppression on behalf of homeowners increases this subsidy and should be expected to
lead to increases in development within the wildland urban interface, thus increasing costs
of suppression (Kousky et al., 2011). Second, fire serves a variety of important ecological
roles, one of which is to remove burnable fuels that have accumulated over time. Though
suppression can yield short-run benefits, when fire returns it may be likely to burn with
greater intensity. Indeed, the increase in the frequency and severity of large wildfires
within the western U.S. has been partially attributed to aggressive suppression over the
course of the twentieth century (Arno et al., 1995; Schoennagel et al., 2004). Therefore,
even when the short-run benefits of suppression outweigh its costs, an accounting that
takes into consideration dynamic consequences may not favor suppression.
Moreover, this analysis measures the total benefits of suppression rather than its
marginal benefits. While this is a limitation, the finding that total avoided losses to
structures are in many cases lower than the total costs of suppression suggests that there
may be many other fires for which marginal avoided losses are lower than marginal costs.
My findings indicate that for some fires, we may be better off not suppressing rather than
suppressing at our current level. However, if marginal costs of suppression are increasing
and marginal benefits are decreasing, my results also suggest that we may be suppressing
beyond the efficient level on a greater number of fires.
A possible explanation for these results is risk aversion on the part of wildfire man-
agers. Previous research has indicated that fire managers may be excessively risk averse,
and that this may affect their decision-making on wildfires (Wilson et al., 2011; Wibben-
meyer et al., 2013; Thompson, 2014). Figure 2.5 shows that in absence of suppression,
most fires spread a relatively short distance; however, there is substantially more prob-
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ability weight in the tail of the distribution of unsuppressed fire spread distances than
there is for suppressed fires. While suppression costs outweigh expected benefits for
many wildfires, fire managers may be averse to risking the possibility of a catastrophic
outcome. Regardless of motivations, the results suggest that we may be over-allocating
resources to suppression of some fires, especially remote wildfires. To be certain of this
result, however, future research will need to investigate other benefits of fire suppression
(such as avoided health costs), as well as the dynamic costs of wildfire suppression.
In addition to contributing to our understanding of responses to wildfire, this paper
contributes to a very small literature on the benefits of adapting and responding to
natural disasters. Previous work has indicated that adaptations and responses to other
categories of natural disasters are possible, but they are taken up at relatively low levels,
which indicates adaptation is expensive (Hsiang and Narita, 2012). Here, I find that
mitigation responses, provided by government agencies, are adopted widely, but that in
many cases the cost of responses may exceed their costs. As well, this paper contributes
an empirical examination of management of a spatial-dynamic resource to a literature
within which nearly all research has been theoretical in nature.
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Table 2.2: Marginal effects of variables affecting suppression effort on probability of
fire extinction
(1) (2) (3)
Marg. Eff. SE Marg. Eff. SE Marg. Eff. SE
Population density > 0
m -.011 (.013) -.0049 (.014) .033* (.013)
m + 1 .07** (.012) .066** (.012) .067** (.011)
Total population
m 8.3e-07 (.00024) 6.8e-06 (.00025) .00019 (.00022)
m + 1 .00046** (.0001) .00045** (.0001) .00044** (.000099)
Total income
m -8.2e-09 (6.0e-09) -8.7e-09 (6.1e-09) -9.5e-09+ (5.6e-09)
m + 1 -4.8e-09 (3.1e-09) -4.5e-09 (3.0e-09) -3.7e-09 (3.0e-09)
Per cap. income
m .00011 (.00066) -4.7e-06 (.00067) -.00043 (.00066)
m + 1 -.00049 (.00055) -.00033 (.00054) -.00067 (.00054)
Contains major road
m .0028 (.015) -.0011 (.015) .038** (.015)
m + 1 .14** (.012) .14** (.012) .12** (.012)
Area TES habitat
(non-stream)
m .0015* (.00064) .0021** (.00064) .0017** (.0006)
m + 1 -.0019* (.00076) -.0024** (.00077) -.0025** (.0007)
Area within 0.5 km of TES
streams
m -.0003 (.00065) -.00012 (.00066) -5.7e-07 (.00062)
m + 1 .0042** (.00055) .0043** (.00058) .0037** (.00052)
Watershed imp. × area
m -.0028 (.0021) .00079 (.002) -.003 (.0023)
m + 1 .0031 (.0028) .00065 (.0027) .0039 (.0028)
Cost variables
TRI × area -.0082** (.00095) -.0041** (.0013) -.00014 (.00094)
Area within 0.5 km of
roads
.00051* (.00023) .0022** (.00027) .0029** (.00025)
Fire spread controls No Yes Yes
Fire FE No No Yes
No. obs. 87,242 85,349 85,267
No. fires 2,119 2,059 2,038
Note: Three spatial leads were included for each variable. With few exceptions, second and
third leads were not statistically different from zero, and they are omitted from the table. All
models include distance from ignition fixed effects. Models two and three include cubic functions
in simulated rate of spread and fire intensity, whose coefficients are reported in Table 2.3. All
standard errors are clustered by fire. Symbols +,*, and ** denote statistical significance at the
.1, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Estimates of the effects of fire simulation outputs on extinction probability.
(1) (2)
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Simulated rate of spread
Linear -.084** (.03) -.32** (.04)
Quadratic .0047 (.0047) .03** (.0063)
Cubic -.00012 (.00019) -.00096** (.00028)
Simulated fire intensity
Linear .00057** (.000096) .0011** (.00013)
Quadratic -2.2e-07** (3.7e-08) -3.2e-07** (5.1e-08)
Cubic 1.9e-11** (3.1e-12) 2.4e-11** (4.7e-12)
Fire spread controls Yes Yes
Fire FE No Yes
No. obs. 85,349 85,267
No. fires 2,059 2,038
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report fire spread coefficients from models estimated
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.2, respectively. Both models include distance
from ignition fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered by fire. Symbols
+,*, and ** denote statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels,
respectively.
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Table 2.4: Estimates of the effects of demographic variables on extinction probability
for models estimated with alternative link functions
(1) (2) (3)
LPM Logit Probit
Marg. Eff. SE Marg. Eff. SE Marg. Eff. SE
Population density > 0
m .023+ (.013) .028* (.013) .026* (.013)
m + 1 .069** (.011) .068** (.011) .067** (.011)
Total population
m .00021 (.00015) .00015 (.00024) .000081 (.00023)
m + 1 .00031** (.000067) .00063** (.00015) .00057** (.00013)
Total income
m -9.6e-09* (4.0e-09) -1.0e-08+ (5.9e-09) -8.6e-09 (5.6e-09)
m + 1 -5.6e-10 (2.1e-09) -4.0e-09 (4.3e-09) -4.4e-09 (3.7e-09)
Per cap. income
m -.000027 (.00059) -.00024 (.00065) -.00019 (.00063)
m + 1 -.00069 (.00052) -.00071 (.00054) -.00065 (.00053)
Contains major road
m .036* (.016) .033* (.015) .033* (.015)
m + 1 .14** (.013) .13** (.012) .13** (.012)
Area TES habitat
(non-stream)
m .0013** (.00048) .0015** (.00056) .0013* (.00054)
m + 1 -.002** (.00058) -.0023** (.00068) -.0021** (.00064)
Area within 0.5 km of TES
streams
m .00014 (.00055) .00012 (.00063) .00022 (.00062)
m + 1 .0033** (.00058) .0036** (.00055) .0034** (.00056)
Watershed importance × area
m -.0033* (.0016) -.0033 (.002) -.0033+ (.0019)
m + 1 .0037+ (.0022) .0041 (.0026) .004 (.0024)
Cost variables
TRI × area -.00029 (.00073) -.00022 (.00093) -.0002 (.00077)
Area within 0.5 km of roads .002** (.0002) .0025** (.00024) .0023** (.00022)
Fire spread controls Yes Yes Yes
Fire FE Yes Yes Yes
No. obs. 85,345 85,267 85,267
No. fires 2,055 2,038 2,038
Note: All models include distance from ignition fixed effects and fire fixed effects, as well
as a cubic functions in simulated rate of spread and simulated fire intensity. All standard
errors are clustered by fire. Symbols +,*, and ** denote statistical significance at the .1,
.05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Marginal effects for demographic variables using alternative numbers of
directions-of-spread for each fire
(1) (2) (3)
48 directions 24 directions 6 directions
Marg. Eff. SE Marg. Eff. SE Marg. Eff. SE
Population density > 0
m .022+ (.012) .013 (.016) .037+ (.022)
m + 1 .084** (.0097) .07** (.014) .039+ (.022)
Total population
m -.000054 (.00037) .000074 (.00016) -.000061 (.000045)
m + 1 .00047* (.00021) .00024* (.000098) .00012* (.00006)
Total income
m -8.9e-09 (7.0e-09) -2.5e-09 (4.7e-09) 4.6e-10 (1.6e-09)
m + 1 1.1e-10 (6.4e-09) -4.0e-09 (3.2e-09) -2.0e-09 (2.0e-09)
Per cap. income
m .000021 (.0006) .000098 (.00074) -.00086 (.0011)
m + 1 -.0011* (.00047) -.00074 (.00066) .00004 (.0012)
Contains major road
m .065** (.015) .051** (.017) .02 (.019)
m + 1 .13** (.011) .09** (.016) .08** (.02)
Area TES habitat
(non-stream)
m .003** (.00095) .00069 (.00043) .00057+ (.00033)
m + 1 -.0036** (.0011) -.00025 (.00057) -.0003 (.00047)
Area within 0.5 km of TES
streams
m -.0011 (.00097) .00079+ (.00044) .00034 (.00033)
m + 1 .0069** (.0008) .0018** (.0004) .0009** (.0003)
Watershed importance × area
m -.00089 (.0033) -.00068 (.0016) .0002 (.0011)
m + 1 .00072 (.004) .0022 (.0021) -.00046 (.0017)
Cost variables
TRI × area -.00035 (.00089) -.0012 (.00085) -.00056 (.00036)
Area within 0.5 km of roads .0051** (.0004) .0018** (.0002) .00084** (.00013)
Fire spread controls Yes Yes Yes
Fire FE Yes Yes Yes
No. obs. 165,970 39,575 20,534
No. fires 2,007 1,859 1,745
Note: All models as specified in column 3 of Table 2.2. Standard errors are clustered by fire.
Symbols +,*, and ** denote statistical significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Net benefits of suppression for California fires 2012-2013, calculated under
varying assumptions of the rate of structure loss in unsuppressed fires
(1) (2) (3)
µ0 = 0.04 µ0 = 0.5 µ0 = 1
Mean net benefit (USD millions) -1.34 105.2 222.0
Median net benefit -4.50 -1.54 -0.90
Minimum net benefit -120.0 -32.7 -30.3
Maximum net benefit 247.1 2867.7 5740.3
Number of fires with net benefits ≥ 0 6 19 25
Number of fires with net benefits < 0 46 33 27
Note: For all columns, µ1 = 0.04.
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Chapter 3
Salience and the Government
Provision of Public Goods
Economists have identified many reasons why governments may fail to provide the so-
cially optimal amount of public goods, including rent seeking (Gradstein, 1993), tax com-
petition (Bucovetsky et al., 1998; Janeba and Wilson, 2011), political decision-making
(Romer and Rosenthal, 1979; Barseghyan and Coate, 2014), and overlapping market areas
(Hochman et al., 1995), among others. This paper examines another obstacle to efficient
provision stemming from the government’s reliance on the public to provide unbiased
information about the benefits derived from public goods. To achieve the Samuelson
(1954) condition, the government needs to know the demand for the good by each mem-
ber of the public. The fact that government provision is required is an indication that
markets for the public good are unlikely to exist, and thus that the government will
not have market data at its disposal to determine preferences. An alternative is for the
government to elicit preferences from the public. However, elicited preferences may not
always reveal the true benefits from public goods. Samuelson recognized this problem,
noting that “it is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to
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have less interest in given collective consumption activities than he really has.” Another
source of “false signals” is that public preferences may be affected by behavioral biases.
We consider the case in which demands for public goods are distorted by salient
events. Salience is a common behavioral bias whereby people’s attention is drawn to
salient features of a decision problem, leading them to overweight prominent informa-
tion in subsequent judgments (Taylor and Thompson, 1982). Empirical evidence from
economics shows that salience affects human decision-making in a broad range of sit-
uations. Consumers are found to be less responsive to changes in price if those prices
occur through increased shipping and handling charges (Hossain and Morgan, 2006) and
stock prices are less responsive to earnings reports when they are issued on Fridays, when
investors are likely to be less attentive (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009). Consumers are
more responsive to tax changes when they are more openly exhibited (eg. Finkelstein,
2009; Chetty et al., 2009; Cabral and Hoxby, 2012). Sexton (2015) found evidence that
when utility customers are enrolled in an automatic bill-pay program, which lowers price
salience, they are more likely to consume greater amounts of energy.
Salient events can bias the preferences expressed by the public, resulting in the ineffi-
cient provision of public goods. As an illustration of this idea, consider the government’s
response to terrorism. Terrorist attacks raise fears among the public about the reoccur-
rence of attacks and have often been followed by military operations and government
investment in security. Viewed through the lens of salience, one can think of an attack
as focusing the public’s attention on the losses that would be incurred under a future
attack. To the extent that these losses stand out from payoffs in other states of the world,
the public may overstate the expected benefits of government actions to reduce threats
of future attacks. One can envision a similar mechanism at work with government pro-
vision of public goods following natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and environmental
catastrophes.
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We formalize the notion of salience in a simple model of public good provision. In our
model, the government allocates a local public good to a community based on expected
benefits elicited from the residents.1 The benefits are expressed as a two-state lottery,
and we assume that one of the payoffs is altered by an exogenous shock. Applying the
mechanism in Bordalo et al. (2012b), the change in the payoff raises its salience and
results in a re-weighting of the state probabilities. This affects the expected benefits
from the public good and the amount allocated by the government. The theoretical
model is used to derive two results. First, we find the conditions under which allocation
of the public good increases or decreases following the shock. An important insight for
the empirical analysis that follows is that even if the shock lowers the payoff, expected
benefits and the public good allocation can increase. Second, we show that in general
the government allocation will be inefficient.
We estimate the effects of salience on public good provision with an empirical analysis
of government projects to reduce wildfire severity. Federal agencies in the U.S., including
the U.S. Forest Service, manage 250 million hectares of wildlands. A central activity
for these agencies is controlling wildfire, on which they spend approximately $3 billion
annually (Gorte, 2013). Of this amount, roughly $0.5 billion is allocated to pre-fire
fuels management projects, which involve removing fuels from the landscape through
mechanical thinning and controlled burns. The goal of these projects is to reduce the
severity of wildfires when they occur.2 We analyze whether projects are more likely to
be placed near communities that have experienced a recent wildfire. Because fire is a
1In practice, preference elicitation can take several forms. The government may use survey methods,
such as contingent valuation (Mitchell and Carson, 1989), or preferences may be revealed by behavior in
related markets and recoverable by hedonic price or travel costs methods (e.g., Freeman et al. (1993)).
Alternatively, the government may elicit preferences through such means as public hearings or contacts
with citizens and elected officials, or from voting results (Osborne and Turner, 2010). Our theoretical
results are also robust to the possibility that government officials themselves are affected by salience.
2For example, removing understory vegetation can reduce the likelihood that trees will burn in a fire.
By reducing the severity of the fire, the agency can lower suppression costs and property damage.
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contagion process whose spread depends on fuel availability, wildfires have the same effect
as fuels management projects — namely, they reduce the volume of fuels and thus the
severity of future fires in an area. Yet, despite the fact that wildfires reduce fire risk,
our theory suggests that salient wildfires may lead the public to overstate the benefits of
fuels management projects. This may result in public agencies locating projects close to
communities that have lower risk because of recent close wildfires.
We identify the effects of salience with a rich panel data set on all fuels management
projects on federal forest lands in the western U.S. between 2003 and 2011. The depen-
dent variable in our empirical model is a binary indicator for whether a fuels management
project was implemented on a given plot of land (cell i) in year t. We focus on cells that
are close to wildland-adjacent communities, which are potentially vulnerable to damages
from wildfire. We think of wildland-adjacent communities as being “treated” when a
wildfire occurs close by and test how treatment changes the probability of fuels man-
agement near the treated community. We measure effects in the year of the fire and for
several years following the fire. Our specification includes grid cell fixed effects to control
for time-invariant determinants of fuels management decisions, such as fire hazard and
proximity to assets at risk,3 and year-by-region fixed effects to control for time-trending
unobservables, such as changes in fuel moisture content. We find strong evidence that
fuels management projects are more likely to be placed near treated wildland-adjacent
communities. Our main results are robust to different definitions of “close” fires and
projects, alternative ways of clustering standard errors, corrections for serial correlation,
inclusion of placebo one and two year leads, and changes in the sample.
An alternative explanation for our empirical results is that government agencies use
the occurrence of wildfires to learn about risks from future fires, as in the application to
3Fire hazard refers to the conditions on the landscape that affect fire behavior, including vegetation
type and terrain. Fire risk is the probability that natural resources, structures, etc., are destroyed by
wildfire.
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flooding by Gallagher (2014). We use two approaches to rule out learning as a competing
explanation for our results. First, the fixed effects in our model control for all time-
invariant and region-level time-varying determinants of fire risk. The regions are defined
as sufficiently small areas (e.g., ranger districts) so that there should be little within-
region variation in fire risk trends. Second, we incorporate into the model a time-varying
measure of vegetation condition that indicates potential wildfire severity. We show that
the effect of a nearby fire on the likelihood of a fuels management project does not
vary with the vegetation condition, as would be expected if the fire informed managers
about the risk of future fires. In addition, we provide further support for the salience
mechanism by showing that effects of close wildfires are magnified near communities with
greater population and more housing units. Consistent with salience theory, our tests
show that close wildfires treat the residents of wildland-adjacent communities and that
fuels management decisions depend on the risks perceived by these residents rather than
objective risks.
In the next section, we present the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data
used in our empirical study, and section 4 presents the main empirical specification and
results, followed by a series of sensitivity analyses, robustness checks, and evaluation of
learning as an alternative to salience. Conclusions are in the final section.
3.1 Theory
Our model builds on recent papers by Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer who provide
a formal model of the effects of salience on individual decision making. In their work,
salience is represented by a function that compares each attribute of a good to a reference
level in order to determine how much that attribute “stands out”. A salience parame-
ter determines the degree to which the salient attribute is weighted in determining the
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consumer’s valuation of the good. This model is used to explain commonly observed be-
havioral biases such as context-dependent willingness-to-pay (Bordalo et al., 2013) and
endowment effects (Bordalo et al., 2012a). Our analysis draws, in particular, on Bordalo
et al. (2012b), who apply salience theory to choice under risk. The authors use their model
to explain long-observed behavioral anomalies such as the Allais paradox and preference
reversals, to account for risk-averse and risk-seeking behavior by the same individual,
and to explain under- and over-weighting of highly unlikely events. Our paper extends
the work of Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, which focuses on individual decision-making
with respect to private goods, to public goods where government provision is required.
The decision-maker in our model is a government agency that provides a local public
good to a community of N residents. The cost of allocating Q units of the good is
C(Q), where C ′ > 0, C ′′ > 0. The public good provides constant marginal benefits b to
individuals within the community. Thus, total benefits from Q units of the public good
are B(Q) = NbQ. The marginal benefit b is a random variable whose value depends
on the future state of the world. We assume there are two states, denoted i = {1, 2},
and define bi as the marginal benefit in state i. The states of the world occur with
probability pii > 0, and thus the benefits from the public good can be represented by
the lottery {(pi1, b1), (pi2, b2)}, where pi2 = 1 − pi1. The lottery’s payoffs are assumed to
be private information known only by the community’s residents. We discuss, below,
the extension of the model to the case where government officials are affected by salient
events.
There are two time periods. At the start of each period, the agency elicits preferences
for the public good from residents of the community4 and allocates the good to maximize
expected net benefits. We allow for residents to be “local thinkers” in the terminology
4Our model accommodates other means by which the government learns about preferences. Residents
may express their demands directly to the agency or indirectly through elected officials and voting.
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of Bordalo et al. (2012b), meaning they overweight salient payoffs in determining the
expected value of the public good. As the government agency must rely on the revealed
or stated preferences of the residents, the agency’s estimate of the expected benefits from
the public good embeds the effects of salience.5 Therefore, the agency allocates Q units of
the public good such that C ′(Q) = NE˜(b), where E˜(b) represents the expected value of b
as expressed by residents of the community. In results presented below, we contrast the
public good allocation based on E˜(b) with the allocation that uses E∗(b) = pi1b1 + pi2b2,
which is computed with the objective probabilities pi1 and pi2.
Bordalo et al. (2012b) model the psychological effects of salience in three stages. First,
decision-makers rank the salience of possible states of the world according to a salience
function. Importantly, the salience function has the ordering property: the salience of
a state is increasing in the distance between the payoffs across lotteries. Second, based
on the salience-rank ki ∈ {1, 2, ...} of state i, where lower integers indicate more salient
states, the probability of state i is distorted to pii = ωipii, where:
ωi =
δki∑
i δ
kipii
. (3.1)
The parameter δ ∈ (0, 1] captures the degree to which salience distorts the decision
weights. When δ = 1, ωi = 1 for all i and there is no distortion of the objective
probabilities. As δ tends toward zero, the decision-maker places more and more weight on
a lottery’s most salient payoffs. Third, decision-makers choose among lotteries according
to their expected values calculated with the weighted probabilities p˜ii.
6
5In particular, because payoffs are private information, the government cannot distinguish over-
weighting of salient payoffs from changes in payoffs.
6As an example, consider the pair of lotteries, {(0.5,−1000), (0.5, 1000)}, {(0.5, 0), (0.5, 1000)}. The
local thinker will tend to ignore the upside payoff (1000) because it is the same in both lotteries.
Instead, she will focus on the downside payoffs, consistent with the ordering property, and re-weight the
probabilities according to equation 3.1. In the case where δ = 0.5, the expected values of the lotteries
(0 and 500) become -333 and 333, respectively.
56
Salience and the Government Provision of Public Goods Chapter 3
In our two-period model, we assume that the payoffs from the public good change
as the result of an exogenous shock occurring between periods 1 and 2. In general, the
shock could change either or both of the payoffs bi. However, for simplicity and because
it is consistent with our empirical application, we consider a change only in the state 1
payoff: payoff b1 changes to b
′
1 in period 2, while b2 is the same in both periods. By the
ordering property of the salience function, state 1 is more salient than state 2 because the
shock produces a non-zero difference in the state 1 payoff between periods 1 and 2. Thus,
the salience ranking for the time 2 lottery is (k1, k2) = (1, 2). The weighting functions
for state probabilities are then given by:
ω1 =
δ
δpi1 + δ2pi2
, ω2 =
δ2
δpi1 + δ2pi2
(3.2)
It follows that when δ < 1, ω1 > 1 and ω2 < 1 and, thus, p˜i1 > pi1 and p˜i2 < pi2. The
shock to payoffs leads to an over-weighting of the payoff in the salient state.
We use the model to derive two results. The first considers whether the shock increases
or decreases the provision of the public good to the community. The second result
examines whether the allocation of the public good is efficient. To derive the first result,
we assume that the period 1 provision of the public good is based on the expected value
E∗(b), derived with the objective probabilities pi1 and pi2. This assumption is not essential,
as we could allow for these probabilities to depart from their true values as a result of
earlier salience effects. What is critical for this result is just that the shock distorts the
period 1 probabilities. However, for the second result it is essential that we use E∗(b) to
determine the efficient allocation of the public good.
Result 1. If b2 − b1 > 0, the agency will increase (decrease) the provision of the public
good when δ > m (δ < m). If b2 − b1 < 0, the agency will increase (decrease) the
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provision of the public good when δ < m (δ > m), where:
m =
pi2(b2 − b1)− (b′1 − b1)
pi2(b2 − b1)
Proof. A proof is provided for the case b2 − b1 > 0. An parallel argument is used for
b2 − b1 < 0. According to the agency’s allocation rule, the amount of the public good
provided is increasing in its expected value. Therefore, the amount provided will increase
(decrease) if E˜(b) > E∗(b) (E˜(b) < E∗(b)). Express the inequalities as p˜i1b′1 + p˜i2b2 ≷
pi1b1 +pi2b2 and rearrange to obtain (1− p˜i2)(b′1−b1) ≷ (pi2− p˜i2)(b2−b1), using p˜i1 = 1− p˜i2
and p˜i1 − pi1 = pi2 − p˜i2. Substitute for p˜i2 and rearrange to obtain δ > m (δ < m). 
We highlight a result for the case b2 − b1 < 0 that matches our empirical application
to wildfire. The state 1 payoff b1 corresponds to the benefits of fuels reduction when a
wildfire occurs, which naturally are larger than the benefits when a fire does not occur
(b2). The shock is a wildfire between periods 1 and 2, which reduces the losses under
a future fire by removing fuels from the landscape and decreasing fire severity. This
reduces the marginal benefits of fuels reduction projects when a fire occurs (b′1 < b1).
However, it also increases the salience of the state 1 payoff. If the salience effect is strong
enough (δ is sufficiently small), then enough weight can be shifted to the higher state 1
payoff to raise the public’s expected value for fuels management.7 Thus, we might find
an increase in the allocation of fuels management following a fire (δ < m), even though
the true expected value of fuels reduction projects has declined.
Result 2. Salience leads to an inefficient allocation of the public good except when b′1 = b2
or δ = 1.
Proof. Given the change to payoff 1, the efficient allocation of the public good should be
7For this to happen, the decline in the state 1 payoff (b1−b′1) cannot be too large, implying 0 < m < 1.
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based on the expected benefit E∗(b) = pi1b′1 + pi2b2. However, the agency will elicit the
value E˜(b) from residents of community, resulting in an over- or under-allocation of the
good as E˜(b) 6= E∗(b). It is easily be shown that E˜(b) = E∗(b) only when b′1 = b2 or
when p˜i1 = pi1 (which implies pi2 = pi2). The latter condition obtains only when δ = 1. 
When the salience parameter equals 1 or the payoffs in the two states are the same,
the probability weights do not affect the allocation decision. Otherwise, when b′1 < b2,
a larger weight will be put on the smaller payoff (b′1), resulting a smaller expected value
and an under-allocation of the public good. The opposite result obtains when b′1 > b2.
Our theory assumes that the preferences of residents are distorted by salient events.
Another possibility is that government officials themselves are influenced by salience. In
this case, if the government’s objective is still to maximize expected net benefits derived
by local residents, then the results of our model carry through.8 Similar to the example
discussed above, a salient wildfire can lead the government to over-estimate the expected
benefit of allocating fuels management projects in an area that just experienced a wildfire.
Whether salient events affect residents or government officials, a testable implication
of our theory is that salience effects will vary with characteristics of the communities
receiving the public good.9 This result is confirmed in our empirical analysis, revealing
that residents of wildland-adjacent communities are part of the mechanism by which
salient events affect the allocation of fuels management projects.
8Anderson et al. (2013) find that public forest managers balance public responsiveness with technical
management.
9A salient event alters the expected benefits E(b). Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the
first-order condition C ′(Q) = NE(b) yields dQdE(b) =
N
C′′ > 0. This result shows that the salience effect
depends on the population size of the community.
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3.2 Data
To test the effects of salience on the provision of local public goods, we combine an
extensive panel data set of the locations of fuels management projects on public lands
with spatial data on wildfire perimeters and locations of wildland-adjacent communities.
Due to the importance of wildfire management in the western U.S., we focus our attention
on lands in 15 western states10 managed by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of
Land Management (BLM), and National Park Service (NPS). We identified these public
lands using BLM and NPS boundaries (BLM, 2014) and administrative National Forest
boundaries for USFS lands. Combined, our study area encompasses approximately 1.5
million square kilometers of federal land, of which the USFS and BLM manage roughly
equal shares (47%), with the remaining 6% is managed by the NPS. We divided this
area into a grid of 1 km × 1 km cells, since this is the approximate size of the average
fuels management project in our data. These 1 km2 cells are the units of analysis for the
empirical analysis.
The fuels management data come from the National Fire Plan Operations and Re-
porting System (NFPORS). The NFPORS database records the point location (latitude
and longitude), dates, and area of all fuels reduction projects for USFS and the Depart-
ment of Interior (including BLM and NPS) lands in the years 2003-2011. Projects are
classified as controlled burns, mechanical thinning, preparation for treatment, and other.
Controlled burns and mechanical thinning account for 94% of the observed projects in our
data. Because NFPORS does not provide the boundaries of fuels management projects,
we used the reported point location and area to estimate boundaries. Using ArcGIS, we
created a polygon layer in which fuels management projects were represented by circles
of the reported area, centered on the reported point location. A grid cell was designated
10These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
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as having received fuels reduction in a given year if the grid cell’s centroid was inside of
an imputed project boundary in that year.
Although the majority of land under federal management is forested (52%), there
are significant areas in shrubs (39%) and grasslands (7%).11 Our data reveal that fuels
reduction projects are implemented on non-forest lands, but at a much lower rate than
on forest lands. As shown in the first panel, second column of Table 3.2, for the whole
sample the rate of fuels reduction projects in evergreen or mixed forests is 2.5%. The
rate is lower (1.1%) in deciduous forests, but still much higher than for other land cover
types. Since fuels reduction activities are concentrated in evergreen and mixed forests,
and the relationships between fire events, fuels reduction activities, and future fire risk
are much less clear in deciduous forests and other land cover types (Keeley et al., 2009;
Moritz et al., 2014), we focus our attention hereafter on forest (evergreen and mixed
forests) lands.12 For the forest-only sample, the USFS is the dominant land management
agency (83% of all grid cells), followed by the BLM (13%) and the NPS (4%).
We define wildland-adjacent communities as wildland urban interface (WUI) Census
blocks, which encompass both interface, where developed residential areas directly abut
large areas of wildland vegetation, and intermix, where residences are dispersed among
wildland vegetation (USDA & DOI, 2001). Wildland urban interface data come from
Radeloff et al. (2005), who mapped U.S. WUI areas using landcover and housing density
data. For our purposes, we consider as WUI any U.S. Census block within our study
region that Radeloff et al. (2005) classified as low, medium, or high density interface
or intermix in 2000. Descriptive statistics for all WUI blocks in the study region are
provided in the second column of Table 3.2.
11We obtained these estimates by overlaying the National Land Cover Data for 2006 on the federal
agency data described above.
12In results not reported here, we find evidence of salience effects on non-forest lands, although it is
less conclusive.
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Table 3.1: Rates of fuels management projects by land cover type
Rate of fuels
management
Fuels management projects per grid cell
Mean
No. obs.
(grid cell-
years)
None Once Twice
3 or
more
times
No. obs.
(grid cells)
I. All grid cells
Evergreen or mixed
forest
0.025 4,830,399 0.86 0.089 0.030 0.020 536,711
Deciduous forest 0.011 211,077 0.93 0.052 0.013 0.005 23,453
Shrubland 0.005 6,392,430 0.97 0.022 0.006 0.003 710,270
Herbaceous 0.006 1,105,470 0.96 0.025 0.007 0.005 122,830
Other 0.005 472,635 0.98 0.015 0.005 0.004 52,515
Total 0.013 13,012,011 0.93 0.047 0.015 0.010 1,445,779
II. Grid cells < 5 km
from WUI
Evergreen or mixed
forest
0.035 1,864,575 0.82 0.108 0.041 0.033 207,175
Deciduous forest 0.012 98,073 0.92 0.057 0.014 0.006 10,897
Shrubland 0.010 1,450,062 0.95 0.035 0.011 0.008 161,118
Herbaceous 0.011 246,996 0.94 0.038 0.012 0.009 27,444
Other 0.012 103,482 0.94 0.037 0.013 0.011 11,498
Total 0.022 3,763,188 0.88 0.072 0.026 0.020 418,132
Note: Land categories taken from the 2006 National Land Cover Database (Fry et al.,
2011). Evergreen forests and deciduous forests consist of greater than 75% evergreen and
deciduous trees, respectively. Mixed forests are areas where neither evergreen nor deciduous
tree species dominate. Shrubland is areas dominated by shrubs less than 5 meters tall.
Herbaceous land includes land dominated by grasses or other herbaceous vegetation. Other
includes planted or cultivated land, developed land, wetlands, barren areas, and water.
For example, on evergreen and mixed forests, 2.5% of our grid cell-year observations are
treated (our dependent variable equals 1 2.5% of the time). 86% of evergreen or mixed
forest grid cells in the study area never received a fuels reduction treatment. 2.0% of grid
cells were treated 3 or more times. Out of the 1,445,779 grid cells, 536,711 are mixed forest
or evergreen forest.
Fire data come from the interdepartmental Monitoring Trends in Burn Severity
(MTBS) project (Eidenshink et al., 2007). In the western U.S., MTBS uses Landsat
satellite imagery to map fire perimeters for fires larger than 1000 acres (approximately 4
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for WUI block data set
All obs.
(mean)
Obs. within 5 km
threshold (mean)
Distance to nearest fire in study period (km) 15.4 14
Population∗ 4,948 4,660
No. of housing units∗ 2,197 2,460
Per capita income∗ 21,361 21,182
Percent graduated high school∗ 83.8 86.5
Number of observations 454,767 105,613
∗Variable is observed only at the Census tract level.
km2). This focus on larger fires makes sense for this study, since we expect larger fires
to be most salient to the public.
Our analysis relies on two distance measures: the distance between each forested grid
cell and its nearest WUI blocks and the distance between each WUI block and the nearest
fire. For each cell, we calculated the straight-line distance to up to 500 of the nearest
WUI blocks within a threshold distance of 10 km. Among the nearly 1.5 million grid
cells in our sample, only 3,147 were matched with the maximum number of WUI blocks.
Therefore, limiting the sample to the closest 500 WUI blocks is unlikely to influence our
results. In a similar way, we measured the straight-line distance from each WUI block
to the nearest fire in each year. Figure 3.1 provides the kernel density functions for our
two distance measures. For forested cells, distances of less than 13 km to the nearest
WUI block are the most common. The density for distances between WUI blocks and
the nearest fire is roughly uniform, although the likelihood of fires within 15 km or more
than 40 km is somewhat lower.
Our empirical strategy requires dropping grid cells that are not close to at least one
WUI block, since we expect the placement of fuels reduction activities far from human
settlement to be determined by factors other than the salience of wildfire risk (e.g.,
protection of timber resources). In our main set of results, the sample consists only of
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Figure 3.1: Kernel density plots of the distributions of distance to WUI and distance
to nearest fire within the sample of forested grid cells and WUI blocks, respectively
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Note: Epanechnikov kernel density functions with bandwidth 5. Distributions are across
observations for which the target layer is closer than 50 kilometers. There are 372 grid 
cells for which the nearest WUI block is further than 50 km. There are 4,787,256 WUI 
block−years for which the nearest fire is further than 50 km.
grid cells closer than 5 km from the nearest WUI block. As described below, however, we
test the sensitivity of our results to different definitions of closeness to WUI blocks. We
find that restricting our attention to grid cells near WUI blocks has little effect on the
basic characteristics of our sample. Compared to the whole sample of grid cells, the rate
of fuels reduction projects increases somewhat when we consider only grid cells within
5 km of a WUI block, but the rate is still highest on forest lands (Table 3.2, panel II).
Restricting our attention to grid cells within 5 km of a WUI reduces the number of WUI
blocks by 77%, but has little effect on average community characteristics (Table 3.2).
To test whether learning can explain our results, we use a measure of vegetation con-
dition from the Landfire project.13 The Vegetation Condition Class (VCC) is a cardinal
measure of the degree to which the current vegetation departs from simulated histori-
cal vegetation conditions. For example, the largest value of VCC corresponds to “high
13Landfire is a partnership of U.S. land management agencies to provide geospatial data on vegetation,
wildland fuel, and fire regimes. See https://www.landfire.gov/about.php#planning (accessed August 31,
2017).
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departure”, which is indicative of a landscape on which fuels have built up due to long-
term fire suppression. A fine-scale measure of the VCC is available for 2001, 2008, and
2012, which we match to the grid cell data described above. Further tests are conducted
with measures of population and number of housing units (Table 3.2). Because access
to block-level U.S. Census data is restricted, these variables are measured at the Census
tract level using data from the 2000 Census.
3.3 Empirical model & results
3.3.1 Overview
The essence of our empirical approach is to determine whether fuels management
projects are more likely to occur on federal lands that are close to WUI communities
that have experienced nearby wildfires. We expect wildfire risk to be more salient to
WUI residents if they can observe smoke plumes, fire-fighting efforts, and possibly the
fire itself. Such highly localized effects of wildfires are supported by findings in McCoy
and Walsh (2014) that fires influence housing prices only if they are within 5 km.
We motivate our empirical approach with Figure 3.2, which shows a small portion
of our study area in the State of Oregon. Light-shaded areas depict lands managed by
federal agencies, and dark-shaded areas are Census blocks classified as WUI. The hatched
area is the burn scar from a fire that occurred in 2011. We think of WUI blocks as being
“treated” by close fires in the sense that the fire raises the salience of wildfire risk for
residents of the WUI block. Our definition of close is varied in the empirical analysis, but
for this illustration it is defined as 5 km. As such, WUI block A is treated because it is
within 5 km of the fire, but WUI blocks farther than 5 km from the fire are untreated. We
then consider whether there is a higher probability of fuels reduction projects occurring
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the experimental design
Fires (MTBS, 2012)
WUI Block
Public lands
A
1
0 5 102.5
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in close proximity to the treated WUI block. We identify all grid cells on federal lands
that are within 5 km of some portion of a WUI block. Grid cells 1 and 2 meet this
criterion (the radius of the solid circle is 5 km). However, only grid cell 1 is close (within
5 km) to at least one treated WUI block (WUI block A), whereas grid cell 2 is close to
untreated blocks. We test whether grid cells that are close to WUI blocks that are close
to fires (e.g., cell 1) are more likely to receive a fuels management project than grid cells
that are close to WUI blocks that have not experienced a nearby fire (e.g., cell 2).
In place of distance to an event, some recent studies have measured salience using more
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direct measures of information transmission. Gallagher (2014) uses the number of local
television stories on floods as a measure of media exposure. For our application, however,
media markets are large relative to the scale at which we expect the effects of wildfires
to operate. In the western U.S., local television media markets are comprised of many
counties and, in some cases, large portions of states.14 Furthermore, to identify effects
of media coverage we would need to omit year-by-region fixed effects from our model
that are defined at much smaller scales than media markets. A second possible way to
operationalize salience is by whether the fire is visible, since McCoy and Walsh (2014) find
that a wildfire has a larger effect on housing prices if the burn scar is visible from a house.
Measuring the visible features of a wildfire is difficult in our case because we are interested
in effects on communities of people rather than single points in space. Communities are
delineated with Census blocks, which are often large in the low density WUI areas we
study. Because of the limitations of media markets or visibility in this context, we use
distance to operationalize salience. We present tests, below, that strengthen our case for
using distance to measure the degree of risk salience.
3.3.2 Main specification
As in recent applications of the difference-in-differences estimator (eg. Conley and
Taber, 2011; Abrevaya and Hamermesh, 2012), we estimate our main specification using
a linear probability model. In a panel data setting, the advantage of the linear proba-
bility model is the ease of including fixed effects. In our application, fixed effects play a
critical role in controlling for unobserved determinants of fuels reduction activities, such
as underlying fire hazard and proximity to assets at risk. An alternative is a binary probit
or logit specification. However, including fixed effects in these models gives rise to the
incidental parameters problem that renders maximum likelihood estimates inconsistent.
14See http://www.nielsen.com/intl-campaigns/us/dma-maps.html (accessed August 31, 2017).
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The linear probability model is a good alternative considering that all of our regressors
are dummy variables and our goal is to estimate their effects at the mean of the data
(Wooldridge 2010).
The main specification of the linear probability model is:
yit = αi +
0∑
`=−4
β`1{∃s ∈ Si : firedists,t+` ≤ c}+ δtm(i) + it (3.3)
where i, t, and s, index cells, years, and WUI blocks, respectively, and m(i) is a mapping
from cell i to an aggregate geographical region (e.g., a Census tract), indexed by m. The
dependent variable, yit, equals 1 if a fuels management project occurs on cell i in year t
and is 0 otherwise. Si = {s : wuidists ≤ d} where wuidists is the distance from cell i
to WUI block s and d is a threshold value. Thus, Si is the set of all WUI blocks within
distance d of cell i. The indicator function 1{·} equals one when a fire occurs close to
at least one of the WUI blocks in the set Si. Specifically, firedists,t+` is defined as the
distance to the closest fire to WUI block s that occurs in year t+ `. If that fire is within
distance c of WUI block s and block s is in the set Si, then the indicator function equals
one. The parameters of the model are αi, β
`, and δtm(i), and it is a random disturbance
term. The summation term in equation (3.3) allows each fire to have a contemporaneous
effect on the probability of fuels management projects (` = 0) and four annual lagged
effects (` = -1 to -4). We examined specifications with more lags, but did not find any
significant coefficients outside the range of effects in equation (3.3).
We identify the salience effects of wildfire based on within grid cell and within year-
by-region variation. We would expect decisions about fuels management projects to be
influenced by such factors as fire hazard, access, and administrative unit. We implicitly
control for these time-invariant factors with cell-level fixed effects αi.
15 Time-varying
15With fixed effects included, cells that are never included in fuels management projects have no
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factors could include macroeconomic trends affecting government budgets, fluctuations
in weather, and changes in management objectives. We control for these factors with year-
by-region effects δtm(i) where regions are alternatively defined as units (USFS national
forests, BLM district offices, NPS national parks), districts (USFS ranger districts, BLM
field offices), counties, and Census tracts. Districts are less aggregated than units16 and
Census tracts are less aggregated than counties. These regions are sufficiently small areas
so that within-region variation in fire risk trends should be minimal.17 We also consider
the degenerate case of a single region, which amounts to including year effects.
We are concerned about the possibility of spatial autocorrelation, which can bias
estimates of standard errors. If, for example, fuels reductions span more than one grid
cell, then the fuels reduction status of neighboring grid cells may be correlated. To
account for this possibility, we cluster the residuals in two ways, first at the district
level and next at the unit level. As a check of robustness, we also estimated our main
specifications with clustering at the level of Census tracts and counties. Our choice of
geographic unit on which to cluster does not substantively affect our results.
The results for the main specification are reported in Table 3.3. All model versions
include cell fixed effects (αi) and consider pixels and wildfires within 5 km of WUI blocks
(i.e., c = d = 5km). The models vary according to the type of year-by-region fixed effects
included. Model (1) includes only year effects. We find the contemporaneous effect of a
close wildfire on the probability of a fuels reduction project to be 1.6 percentage points, an
estimate that is significantly different from zero at the 1% confidence level. We interpret
the contemporaneous effect as an immediate response to a wildfire.18 The effect is large
influence on the model estimates.
16For NPS lands, there is no region less aggregated than a unit (National Park); therefore, year-by-
district fixed effects and year-by-unit fixed effects are equivalent on NPS lands.
17We discuss potential time-varying determinants of fire risk in more detail, below, when we evaluate
learning as an alternative explanation for our results.
18Alternatively, fuels reduction projects could be accurately placed in anticipation of wildfires. We
examine this possibility, below, with a specification that includes lead effects of wildfires, and find little
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Table 3.3: Main specification predicting fuels reduction status of forested grid cells
conditional on whether nearby WUI Census blocks experienced recent wildfires
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
firecloset 0.0161 0.0182 0.0161 0.0167 0.0163
(0.0038)** (0.0039)** (0.0037)** (0.0042)** (0.0041)**
(0.0048)** (0.005)** (0.0043)** (0.0053)** (0.0051)**
firecloset−1 0.0074 0.0081 0.006 0.0058 0.0085
(0.0032)* (0.0024)** (0.0025)* (0.0027)* (0.0033)*
(0.0043) (0.0031)** (0.0028)* (0.0031) (0.0043)*
firecloset−2 0.0044 0.0058 0.0018 0.0051 0.0040
(0.0032) (0.0029)* (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0029)
(0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0031)
firecloset−3 0.0001 0.0004 0.0011 0.0011 0.0005
(0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0029)
(0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0025)
firecloset−4 -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0009
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0025)
(0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0023)
Fixed effects Year Year×unit Year×district Year×county Year×tract
No. of groups 207,175 207,175 207,175 207,175 207,175
No. of obs. 1,864,575 1,864,575 1,864,575 1,864,575 1,864,575
Note: Regressions include grid cells within 5 km of any WUI Census block. Fireclose
equals 1 if a fire occurred within 5 kilometers of a nearby Census block and 0
otherwise. The sample is limited to pixels NLCD classifies as forested in 2006. In
addition to fixed effects noted in the table, all models include grid cell fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are clustered by district first and unit second, ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05.
relative to the average annual rate of fuels reduction projects in our sample. We also find
a significant effect (p < 0.05) of a close fire that occurred one year previously, but only
when we cluster the errors at the district level. This effect is smaller, indicating that a
fire last year raises the probability of a fuels reduction project by 0.7 percentage points.
Fires that occur two, three, and four years earlier do not have significant effects.
The inclusion of year-by-region effects sharpens the results. In models (2) through
(5), the contemporaneous effect remains at approximately 1.6-1.8 percentage points, but
evidence for it.
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now the one-year lagged effect is significantly different from zero, whether clustering of
standard errors is at the unit or district level. The results indicate that a close fire one
year ago increases the probability of fuels management by 0.6 to 0.9 percentage points. In
models (3), (4), and (5), longer lags do not have significant effects; however, the two-year
lag in model (2) is significantly different from zero at the 5% level when standard errors
are clustered at the district level. The estimate of 0.6 is lower than the one-year lagged
effect (0.8), adding further evidence that the salience of wildfire risk diminishes with the
time since the fire.
3.3.3 Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks
We conduct sensitivity analyses and robustness checks on our main specification. The
first test evaluates the sensitivity of our results to the definition of close fires (fires within
a distance c of the WUI) and close cells (cells within a distance d of the WUI). Figure 3.3
presents the coefficients on the firedist variable for all combinations of c = 2, 5, 10 and
d = 2, 5, 10, using version (2) of the model in Table 3.3. The lines in each panel correspond
to different definitions of close fires and the three panels correspond to different definitions
of close grid cells. For example, when we limit close fires and close cells to those within
2 km (c = d = 2; the dashed blue line in Panel A), we find that a close fire raises the
probability of a fuels management project by approximately 2.5 percentage points. The
effect is strong and persistent to a three-year lag (coefficient values marked by a solid
triangle are significantly different from zero at the 5% level and those marked by an “x”
are not).
Taken together, the results in Figure 3.3 provide support for the hypothesized salience
mechanism and the use of distance to measure risk salience. First, fires that occur closer
to WUI residents have larger effects. In all three panels, the dashed blue line, correspond-
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity analysis of thresholds for fireclose and wuiclose
ing to fires within 2 km, is always above the dashed-dotted green line, corresponding to
fires within 10 km. Expanding the fire proximity threshold (c) is likely to include fires
that are not as salient to WUI residents. Second, for a given fire, salience effects are
amplified at distances close to WUI residents. Lines in Panel A, corresponding to grid
cells within 2 km of WUI blocks, tend to be higher than those in panel C, corresponding
to grid cells within 10 km of WUI blocks. When we expand the size of the window around
WUI blocks (d) we include fuels management projects that provide few benefits to WUI
residents concerned with wildfire risk.
The second set of sensitivity analyses considers the possibility of serial correlation in
our data. There may be negative serial correlation if management agencies are less likely
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to undertake a fuels management project in locations where fuels have recently been
reduced. On the other hand, there may be positive serial correlation if projects take
more than one year to complete or if fuels management projects take place in adjacent
areas over several years and we mismeasure the precise boundaries of these activities.19
Statistics in Table 3.2 show that, conditional on a fuels reduction project taking place,
most grid cells receive fuels management only once. However, it is not uncommon for grid
cells to receive fuels management two or more times. We address serial correlation by
recoding the dependent variable so that a multi-year fuels management project appears as
a single-year project (Table 3.4). For example, if yit = yit+1 = 1, we recode the variables
as yit = 1, yit+1 = 0. In general, when we observe a cell with consecutive values of one,
we set all but the first value to zero. This recoding procedure has the effect of purging
the data of serial correlation due specifically to multi-year fuels reductions. We estimate
all versions of the main specification with the recoded data and find little difference in
the results.20
We estimate a version of equation (3.3) with one- and two-year leads (Table 3.5)
as a placebo test, as we would not expect the likelihood of observing a fuels reduction
project today to be influenced by the occurrence of future fires. Significant lead effects
could be due to omitted time-varying cell-level factors that are correlated with wildfires
and fuels reduction projects. Formally, lead parameters are included by modifying the
summation term in equation (3.3) so that ` takes values from -4 to 2. A finding of
insignificant lead coefficients gives us further confidence that we identify causal effects
19This is possible given the way we define boundaries for fuels reduction projects, described in sec-
tion 3.2.
20Another way to test whether our results are robust to the possibility of serial correlation is with
the estimator in Arellano and Bond (1991). We estimate versions of equation (3.3) that include one-
and two-year lagged dependent variables. The results, available from the authors upon request, provide
evidence of positive serial correlation. The coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are positive
and significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, we still find evidence of contemporaneous effects of
close fires on the likelihood of fuels management projects. The effects of fires in previous years are no
longer significant, most likely because the lagged dependent variables absorb the effects of past fires.
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Table 3.4: Test of robustness in which the dependent variable is recoded in order to
examine the influence of multi-year fuels reduction projects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
firecloset 0.0155 0.0171 0.0162 0.0164 0.0159
(0.0036)** (0.0038)** (0.0036)** (0.004)** (0.0039)**
(0.0045)** (0.0047)** (0.0039)** (0.0049)** (0.0047)**
firecloset−1 0.0072 0.0071 0.0058 0.0056 0.0080
(0.003)* (0.0022)** (0.002)** (0.0024)* (0.0032)*
(0.0041) (0.003)* (0.0022)** (0.0029) (0.0043)
firecloset−2 0.0036 0.005 0.002 0.0047 0.0032
(0.0026) (0.0024)* (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0024)
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0024)
firecloset−3 -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0007
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0025)
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023)
firecloset−4 -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0019
(0.002) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0023)
(0.002) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.002)
Fixed effects Year Year×unit Year×district Year×county Year×tract
No. of groups 207,175 207,175 207,175 207,175 207,175
No. of obs. 1,864,575 1,864,575 1,864,575 1,864,575 1,864,575
Note: Regressions include grid cells within 5 km of any WUI Census block. Fireclose
equals 1 if a fire occurred within 5 kilometers of a nearby Census block and 0
otherwise. The sample is limited to pixels NLCD classifies as forested in 2006. In
addition to fixed effects noted in the table, all models include grid cell fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are clustered by district first and unit second, ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05.
of wildfires on government agency decisions and are not simply finding that agencies
locate fuels management projects in areas that are likely to experience wildfires. The
estimated coefficients on the lead variables are small relative to the contemporaneous
and lagged parameters and not significantly different from zero with the exception of the
two-year lead in models (2) and (5). Estimates of the other model coefficients are largely
unaffected.
Although our data set only includes pre-fire fuels reduction projects (predominantly
controlled burns and mechanical thinning), it is conceivable that some post-fire activities
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Table 3.5: Placebo test in which two-year leads of fireclose are included in order to
rule out joint determination of fire and fuel reduction project locations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
firecloset 0.0176 0.0204 0.0182 0.0188 0.0190
(0.0045)** (0.0048)** (0.004)** (0.0051)** (0.0049)**
(0.0059)** (0.0063)** (0.0049)** (0.0065)** (0.0062)**
firecloset−1 0.0105 0.0104 0.0084 0.0085 0.0117
(0.0036)** (0.0029)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.0038)**
(0.0049)* (0.0035)** (0.0032)** (0.0035)* (0.005)*
firecloset−2 0.0088 0.01 0.0041 0.0098 0.0081
(0.0041)* (0.0037)** (0.0033) (0.0042)* (0.0039)*
(0.0045) (0.004)* (0.0033) (0.0044)* (0.0043)
firecloset−3 0.0043 0.0037 0.0028 0.0051 0.0053
(0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0038)
(0.0033) (0.0028) (0.003) (0.0029) (0.0032)
firecloset−4 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0028)
(0.0028) (0.003) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028)
firecloset+1 0.0027 0.0042 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.003) (0.0028) (0.0029)
(0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0028)
firecloset+2 0.0039 0.0071 0.0058 0.0047 0.0062
(0.0029) (0.0031)* (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0031)*
(0.0031) (0.0036)* (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0035)
Fixed effects Year Year×unit Year×district Year×county Year×tract
No. of groups 207,175 207,175 207,175 207,175 207,175
No. of obs. 1,450,225 1,450,225 1,450,225 1,450,225 1,450,225
Note: Regressions include grid cells within 5 km of any WUI Census block. Fireclose
equals 1 if a fire occurred within 5 kilometers of a nearby Census block and 0
otherwise. The sample is limited to pixels NLCD classifies as forested in 2006. In
addition to fixed effects noted in the table, all models include grid cell fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are clustered by district first and unit second, ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05.
could be misclassified as fuels management. Soon after a fire, land managers may thin
trees, clear debris, and conduct salvage logging. In this case, we might interpret post-fire
activities as a response by managers to heightened risk salience. We guard against this
possibility by dropping all observations within the perimeter of an earlier fire (Table 3.6).
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Table 3.6: Base specification with observations within the perimeter of previous fires
removed to avoid misclassification of post-fire activities as fuels reductions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
firecloset 0.0121 0.0139 0.0115 0.0125 0.0125
(0.0032)** (0.0034)** (0.0035)** (0.0036)** (0.0035)**
(0.0039)** (0.0042)** (0.0039)** (0.0044)** (0.0041)**
firecloset−1 0.0031 0.0049 0.004 0.0031 0.0038
(0.0028) (0.0025)* (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0025)
(0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0027)
firecloset−2 0.0033 0.0042 -0.0001 0.0037 0.0028
(0.0035) (0.003) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0031)
(0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0031)
firecloset−3 -0.0021 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0018
(0.0034) (0.003) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0029)
(0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0025)
firecloset−4 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0007
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0029)
(0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0024)
Fixed effects Year Year×unit Year×district Year×county Year×tract
No. of groups 200,895 200,895 200,895 200,895 200,895
No. of obs. 1,770,739 1,770,739 1,770,739 1,770,739 1,770,739
Note: Regressions include grid cells within 5 km of any WUI Census block. Fireclose
equals 1 if a fire occurred within 5 kilometers of a nearby Census block and 0
otherwise. The sample is limited to pixels NLCD classifies as forested in 2006, and
pixels within the perimeter of previous fires have been removed. In addition to fixed
effects noted in the table, all models include grid cell fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered by district first and unit second, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
This is likely an overly conservative approach as we may discard information about fuels
reduction activities that occurred in response to a later fire occurring within the perimeter
of an earlier fire. Nevertheless, we continue to find a significant contemporaneous effect
and, in model (2), a one-year lagged effect that is significant at the 5% level.
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3.3.4 Learning as an alternative to salience
An alternative interpretation of our empirical results is that government agencies
learn about risks from future fires when a wildfire occurs. The key question to ask is,
what information could a wildfire provide to land managers? In other words, what factors
determine the likelihood of a future fire? Parisien et al. (2012) study the determinants of
large wildfires in the western U.S. over the period 1984-2008. Their statistical analysis
identifies three categories of variables — ignitions, climate, and topography/vegetation
— that have statistically significant effects on the probability that a given grid cell
burned in a large fire. Some of these factors are not applicable to our study of public
forest lands (population density and land use) and others are controlled for by the grid-
cell level fixed effects (topographic roughness, road density21) and year-by-region fixed
effects in our model (large-scale measures of lightning strikes). Parisien et al. (2012) find
that wildfire probability is predicted by a number of climate variables, including long-
term temperature, precipitation, and wind speed means. It is conceivable that weather
distributions changed over the period of analysis (i.e., climate change occurred) or that
there were sustained periods of weather anomalies such as droughts or extended rainy
periods. Wildfires may have alerted land managers to the effects of these events on future
fire risk. However, because climate change and weather anomalies tend to be large-scale
phenomena, they are also controlled for by the year-by-region fixed effects.22 The smallest
region used in our analysis is the Census tract, which has an average size of 364 km2. For
comparison, the area of the Isle of Wight in the United Kingdom is 380 km2 and Lake
Tahoe in the USA is 495 km2 in size.
21Parisien et al. (2012) indicate that there was little year-to-year variation in topographic roughness
and road densities over the period 1984-2008, which mostly covers our study period.
22Parisien et al. (2012) find that the capacity of a site to produce biomass, measured as gross primary
productivity, is also associated with wildfires, but indicate that productivity is largely determined by
climate.
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Although we expect the fixed effects in our model to control for the key determinants
of fire risk, we provide a formal analysis using the Vegetation Condition Class (VCC)
measure described above. The VCC indicates the amount of fuels on the landscape and,
thus, the potential for severe wildfires. If managers learn about vegetation conditions
from local wildfires and the fixed effects in our model do not adequately control for fire
risk, then the response to a nearby wildfire should be magnified when there are heavy fuel
loads. We investigate this hypothesis by interacting the VCC variable with the treatment
variable:
yit = αi+
0∑
`=−4
β`1{∃s ∈ Si : firedists,t+` ≤ c}
+ ζ
0∑
`=−4
[V CCi,t+` × 1{∃s ∈ Si : firedists,t+` ≤ c}] + δtm(i) + it
(3.4)
where V CCi,t+` is the condition class for cell i in year t+ ` and ζ is a model parameter.
If the estimate of ζ is positive and significantly different from zero, then the effect of
a wildfire on the probability of a fuels management project increases with fuels loads.
However, results in Table 3.7 reveal an insignificant effect of VCC, in opposition to the
learning model.23 The original estimates of the β coefficients are unchanged when we
include the VCC interaction term.
3.3.5 Additional support for the salience mechanism
To provide additional support for salience, we show that the effects of close fires vary
with characteristics of WUI communities and the size of fires. We estimate two sets of
23In equation (3.4), ζ is restricted to be the same for the contemporaneous and lagged effects. We use
this parsimonious specification because we do not have strong a priori reasons to expect the marginal
effects of VCC to differ by the length of the lag. We estimated alternative models that allow each lag to
have a different coefficient. Based on F -tests reported in Table 3.7 we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the coefficients are equal.
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models with interactions similar to (3.4).24 The first version is specified:
yit = αi+
0∑
`=−4
β`1{∃s ∈ Si : firedists,t+` ≤ c}
+ ζ
0∑
`=−4
∑
s∈Si
[zs × 1{firedists,t+` ≤ c}] + δtm(i) + it
(3.5)
where zs is a characteristic of WUI block s or of the fire that treats block s. We define zs
as, alternatively, the population of the Census tract, the number of housing units in the
Census tract, and logged fire size.25 The second version of the model in (3.5) includes
VCC as a control for objective fire risk.
Results in Table 3.7 reveal that the effects of a close wildfire are larger as the popula-
tion and the number of housing units increase. The finding that salience effects vary with
community characteristics confirms a prediction of our theoretical model and shows that
local residents are part of the salience mechanism (see also Anderson et al. (2013)). The
results are consistent with the preferences of residents being shaped by salient events or
with government officials being affected by salience and operating on behalf of residents.
The coefficient for fire size is positive but significantly different from zero at only the
8% level. The lack of significance may be due to the fact that the fire data we use only
includes relatively large fires. Finally, we find that the effects of resident characteristics
and fire size are unchanged when we control for landscape conditions with the VCC vari-
able. This suggests that fuels management decisions depend on the risks perceived by
WUI residents rather than on objective risks.
24As in equation (3.4), ζ is restricted to be the same for the contemporaneous and lagged effects.
According to F -tests reported in Table 3.7, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are
equal.
25We estimate the fire size version of the model with the sample used to produce Table 3.6. A large
fire could augment salience but also limit the area available for fuels treatments. By using the restricted
sample, our estimate measures only the first effect.
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Table 3.7: Variation in salience effects by census block characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population
Housing
units
Ln(Fire size) VCC
I. Interaction coefficient 1.1e-06 2.9e-06 .0011 -.0041
(5.4e-07)* (9.8e-07)** (.00099) (.0036)
II. Interaction coefficient 1.1e-06 2.9e-06 .0011
(5.4e-07)* (9.8e-07)** (.00099)
VCC
.00068 .00065 .0012
(.00056) (.00056) (.00054)*
Grid cells within past fire
perimeters
Yes Yes No Yes
No. demog. interaction lags 4 4 4 4
No. of groups 207,175 207,175 200,895 207,175
No. of obs. 1,864,575 1,864,575 1,770,739 1,864,575
F-statistic 0.3611 1.2714 0.2721 0.8673
Mean 4,949 2,359 8.96 2.38
Min 0 1 7.01 1.01
Max 36,146 9,905 12.4 3.86
Note: Row I presents the coefficient on the interaction terms as specified in Equa-
tions (3.4) and (3.5) and added to regressions as in column 3 of Table 3. Row II
presents a set of separate regression results that also includes a control for vegeta-
tion condition class (VCC), whose coefficient is reported. Robust standard errors
are clustered by unit, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Reported F-statistics use results from
an unreported regression to test the null hypothesis that estimated ζ coefficients
from regressions in row I are equal across lags of the interaction. An F-statistic
less than 3.00 indicates insufficient evidence that ζ coefficients differ among lags.
The reported mean, maximum, and minimum in each column correspond to sample
statistics for each each column’s variable (zs) among all treated blocks.
3.4 Conclusions
The economics literature on salience has focused on how consumption of private goods
is affected by salient features of the choice problem. In this paper, we extend this liter-
ature to examine how salience can affect the government provision of public goods. In
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our theoretical model, the benefits from a local public good are represented as a lottery.
An exogenous shock makes a payoff more salient to residents of a community, causing
them to over-weight the payoff in the salient state and miscalculate expected benefits. If
the government bases its provision of the public good on expected benefits as expressed
by the residents, then the allocation of the good will be inefficient. Samuelson (1954)
recognized that the public may have incentives to misrepresent their preferences for a
public good. In addition, there has been a long-running debate among economists about
whether preferences for public goods can be reliably determined using direct elicita-
tion methods (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Hanemann, 1994; Carson, 2012; Hausman,
2012). In our case, the problem faced by the government is not deceit or flawed survey
methods, but rather that the preferences expressed by the public have been biased by
exogenous events.
The theoretical model in our paper provides insights into the nature of the inefficiency.
We show that the allocation of the public good can increase even when the shock decreases
one of the payoffs, which necessarily means that the true expected value of the good has
declined. If the shock affects the higher-valued payoff, then enough weight can be shifted
to this payoff such that the public’s expected value for the good increases. This outcome
is more likely to occur when the salience effect is large.
This result matches our empirical application, where we find support for the salience
theory of public goods provision. We find that federal land management agencies in
the western U.S. are more likely to locate fuels management projects near communities
that have experienced a nearby wildfire. This increased response comes even as the
recent wildfire has likely decreased the likelihood of loss from future fires. With our main
specification, we estimate that the probability of a fuels management project increases by
1.6 to 1.8 percentage points in the year the fire occurs, declining to 0.6 to 0.9 percentage
points in the year after the fire. These are relatively large changes considering that the
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average annual rate of fuels management projects on all forested lands in our sample is
approximately 3.5% (see Table 3.2). Our finding that the effects of the nearby wildfire
attenuate after one or two years does not necessarily mean that the salience of fire risk
has diminished, as suggested by the results in McCoy and Walsh (2014). Our results are
also consistent with a prompt response by the government that satisfies the increased
demand for fuels management. One way to investigate the dynamics of salience would
be to consider WUI blocks that experience nearby fires in multiple years and see how the
effects change over time. For this analysis we would need a data set covering a longer
time period.
The results of robustness checks support our claim that we identify salience effects.
First, we find that the effects of nearby wildfires on the likelihood of observing fuels
managment projects are strengthened when we focus our analysis on closer fires, which
should be more salient to WUI residents (Figure 3.1). The effects also increase when we
consider grid cells closer to WUI communities, suggesting that the federal agencies are
responding to heightened demand for fuels management projects. Second, we find that
effects of nearby wildfires increase with the population of the WUI community and the
number of housing units (Table 3.7). These results suggest that the residents of WUI
communities are part of the mechanism for determining the location of fuels management
projects, consistent with our salience theory. Finally, we find evidence that contradicts
alternative explanations for our results. The finding of insignificant coefficients on lead
variables suggests that agencies are not simply locating fuels management projects in
places that are likely to have fires. As well, our finding that vegetation condition does
not magnify the effects of nearby fires guards against the possibility that our results
reflect learning by agencies about the risk of future fires.
In addition to local public goods such as fuels management on public lands, salience
could affect the government provision of national-level public goods. There are many
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examples of salient events that act as a catalyst for government action. In response to
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the U.S. Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 that required double hulls on oil tankers. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in
1979 led to stricter controls on nuclear plants and the outbreak of West Nile virus in New
York City in 1999 prompted the creation of a national surveillance system for infectious
diseases in the U.S. Catastrophic flooding of the Mississippi River has often been followed
by government-funded levee building and other channel engineering projects (Wright,
2000). These may be rational responses by the government to new information about
the demand for public goods. However, our paper offers an alternative explanation. The
public’s demand may be distorted by the salience of the catalyzing event, which would
mean that the government response to heightened demand for public goods is inefficient.
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Chapter 4
Inequality and government
responsiveness: Evidence from
salient wildfire events
Over the past several decades, there has been a movement toward government decision-
making arrangements that encourage participation among stakeholders in the making
and administration of policy. Proponents of participatory governance, as these arrange-
ments are known, argue that greater participation will yield more effective and informed
policy (eg. Pateman, 1970). In recent years, however, political scientists have recognized a
potential tension between equitable outcomes and government responsiveness: if govern-
ment is more responsive to some citizens than to others, inequitable policy outcomes may
result. A substantial body of literature has examined how policymaker responsiveness (in
terms of roll-call votes, or enacted policies) to constituent preferences varies across demo-
graphic groups (eg. Gilens 2005 or Bartels 2008). Yet policy outcomes only begin with
legislation; downstream, disparities in responsiveness in the bureaucratic administration
of policy can have implications for inequality as well.
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In this paper, we study differential responsiveness among bureaucratic government
agency administrators to demands from demographically-varying communities. Specifi-
cally, we focus on provision of wildfire risk reduction projects within the western U.S. In
the western U.S., a large portion of the wildlands on which wildfires occur are federally-
owned and managed. Therefore, federal land managers choices regarding fuel reduction
project locations have potential to meaningfully influence wildfire risk. If projects are
unduly awarded to favored communities, they have potential to exacerbate inequality.
Fuel projects may be disproportionately located near particular types of communities
due to differences in agency responsiveness across communities. Alternatively, they may
be disproportionately located near particular types of communities due to discrepancies
in the degree of risk different types of communities face. For example, if individuals higher
income individuals disproportionately choose to live in forested, high fire risk areas, we
might also expect them to disproportionately benefit from fuels reduction projects. To
distinguish between these two explanations, we use a quasi-experimental design motivated
by our prior work on wildfire risk salience and demand for fuels projects. In chapter 3,
we hypothesize that after wildfire events, when wildfire risk is at the top of homeowners
minds, they will be more likely to demand agencies place fuels projects nearby. Our
findings show that fuel project rates are 50-75% higher near communities that have
recently experienced wildfire. Here, we use the occurrence of wildfire as an exogenous
shock to demands for fuels projects. We then compare how responsiveness to these
demands differs across demographically-varying communities. As in chapter 3, we find
that federal fuels project rates increase near communities that have recently experienced
wildfires; however, these increases are stronger for communities that are less diverse,
more educated, and younger. In contrast to some of the existing literature, we do not
find that income is a primary determinant of government responsiveness.
This paper makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, it contributes
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to the limited literature on bureaucratic decision-making and shows how differences in
responsiveness among bureaucratic decision-makers can increase inequality. While over
the last fifteen years a literature has emerged studying inequality in government respon-
siveness, this literature has for the most part ignored potential inequalities in policy
administration. Our results suggest that this is a potentially important channel through
which government policy can increase inequality. Second, this paper contributes to the
literature on inequality in government responsiveness by using panel data and a quasi-
experimental design to causally identify differences in responsiveness across communities.
Findings within the existing literature are mixed, perhaps in part because existing stud-
ies either rely on cross-sectional or time-series data and therefore do not fully identify
effects of responsiveness from other correlated factors.
Before proceeding to our study design and results, we will provide additional back-
ground regarding the extant literature, and the setting in which our study takes place.
The next section discusses in greater detail the existing literature on government respon-
siveness and inequality, as well as the literature on bureaucratic decision-making and the
role of interest groups. In section 4.1, we discuss wildfire management in the western
U.S., the role of fuel reduction projects, and the planning process used by federal agencies
in determining how and where to situate these projects. This process includes significant
opportunities for public comment. We conclude section 4.1 by briefly describing existing
work on the role of salience in responses to natural disasters. Our prior work on this topic
describes how risk salience in the wake of a disaster can distort agency responses when
public agencies are open and responsive to the demands of the public. This finding mo-
tivates the empirical strategy we develop in this paper, which we describe in section 4.3.
In section 4.4, we discuss our results. We conclude by discussing implications of this
research, as well as its limitations of this study and potential paths forward for future
research.
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4.1 Related Literature
As Wlezien and Soroka (2011) argue, increasing responsiveness may lead to increas-
ingly inequitable outcomes under two conditions: (1) policy preferences must differ across
groups, and (2) government responsiveness must vary across groups. Since the first condi-
tion is generally taken as given, research has focused on examining the second condition.
Researchers have proposed a few possible explanations for possible differences in gov-
ernment responsiveness across demographic groups. First, a large literature indicates
political participation varies across groups (eg. Verba et al., 1995), with higher income
and higher SES individuals participating at higher rates. These groups may apply greater
pressure to politicians and government officials. Another reason to expect that govern-
ment officials might respond differentially to high SES groups is that politicians and
government officials tend to be high SES themselves. Government officials tend to be
relatively high income, highly educated individuals, and they may be more sympathetic
to the views of similar individuals (Page et al., 2013).
Motivated by these ideas, a variety of studies over the past fifteen years have tested for
inequality in responsiveness among policy-makers, usually by following Gilens (2005) in
relating political outcomes (eg. roll-call votes, legislation) to constituent opinions across
the income distribution. So far, however, these studies have not yielded a consensus
regarding bias among policymakers. As Kelly and Enns (2010) point out, studies that
find that policymakers are more responsive to higher income individuals tend to rely on
cross-sectional policy outcome data (eg. Gilens, 2005; McCarty et al., 2009; Gilens, 2011).
On the other hand, studies that make use of time-series data (eg. Ura and Ellis, 2008;
Wlezien and Soroka, 2011) cannot identify differences in responsiveness across income
groups because shifts in political opinions over time tend to be correlated across income
groups.
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More recently, researchers have begun to examine differences in responsiveness out-
side of the policy-making process. The two studies most closely related to this paper
are Sances (2016) and Grimes and Esaiasson (2014), both of which examine inequality
in responsiveness among local government officials. Grimes and Esaiasson 2014 study
siting of locally undesirable land uses, such as waste facilities, in Sweden. Consistent
with the environmental justice literature (Ringquist, 2005), they find that locally unde-
sirable land uses are more likely to be placed near low SES communities. However, they
find that electoral participation more strongly predicts siting decisions than income. A
weakness of this study is that it relies on cross-sectional data. It is likely that individuals
with low propensity to participate in the political process might sort into inexpensive,
undesirable locations, which might also be more likely to become sites of waste facilities.
Sances (2016) use panel data, as well as an exogenous shift in responsiveness caused by
a change in how local assessors are chosen, to study effects of decreased responsiveness
across the income distribution. He finds that towns that with elected assessors are less
likely perform property value reassessments, which tend to increase the effective tax rate
paid by owners of high-value homes. Throughout the literature on government respon-
siveness and inequality, data limitations have led to difficulty in identifying differences
in responsiveness across groups. Like Sances (2016), we add to this literature by making
use of panel data to credibly identify these differences.
Further, we explore an as yet unexplored avenue through which government programs
yield unequal outcomes. Most studies examining inequality in government responsive-
ness have focused on responsiveness among elected officials. This makes sense, given that
elected officials tend to be more responsive to demands from the public than appointed
officials or bureaucrats (Besley and Coate, 2003; Canes-Wrone et al., 2014; Whalley,
2013). Nevertheless, while bureaucratic decision-making is motivated by a diverse set
of factors, including budget maximizing (Niskanen, 1971), concerns regarding career ad-
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vancement (Dewatripont et al., 1999), and intrinsic motivations (Besley and Ghatak,
2005; Prendergast, 2007), satisfying demands of the public may be an important motiva-
tion. A large literature points to the influence interest groups can have on bureaucratic
decision-making. As the next section will discuss, interest groups may be particularly
influential in the case of environmental management within the U.S., which since the
1970s has required government administrators to engage the public within the planning
process.
4.2 Wildfire fuels projects and federal land manage-
ment
Over the past several decades, wildfire activity has sharply increased within the west-
ern U.S. (Dennison et al., 2014). Since the 1970s, the annual number of large wildfires
(fires larger than 400 hectares) within the western U.S. has increased by over 500 percent,
while area burned in large wildfires has increased by over 1200 percent (Westerling, 2016).
Researchers have generally attributed this trend to the combined effects of climate change
(eg. Westerling et al., 2006; Abatzoglou and Williams, 2016) and high fuel loads within
western forests (Arno et al., 1995; Keane et al., 2002; Naficy et al., 2010). For much of
the twentieth century, the US Forest Service (USFS) and other public agencies took an
aggressive stance toward suppressing wildfires. The effects of fire exclusion differ across
forest types; however, in many open canopy western forests where frequent low intensity
fires have historically removed understory brush and debris, fire exclusion has led to a
build-up of ladder fuels, which carry fire from a forests understory to its canopy. In these
forest types (eg. dry forests such as ponderosa pine forests within the U.S. southwest and
Sierra Nevada mountains), fire exclusion has increasingly led to larger and more severe
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wildfires (Schoennagel et al., 2004). As wildfire activity has increased, so too has federal
spending on wildfire management. The US Forest Service now consistently spends ap-
proximately 50 percent of its annual discretionary budget on wildfire management, while
in 2000 it spent less than 20 percent (Thompson et al., 2015). The agency, which incurs
approximately 70 percent of total federal suppression costs, spent nearly $2.4 billion on
fire suppression in 2017. Of this, $375 million were spent on hazardous fuel removal
projects (USFS, 2017).
Wildfire fuels projects are projects intended to reduce wildfire risk by restoring the
forest to conditions under which high intensity fires are less likely. Fires that burn in the
forest canopy (called crown fires) are hotter and more difficult to contain; therefore, fuel
projects are generally designed to remove fuels that promote crown fires. In particular,
fuel projects aim to remove surface and ladder fuels, which can cause a fire to burn
into the forest canopy, and to reduce the density of the forest canopy, which reduces
potential for crown fire spread (Agee and Skinner, 2005). These goals are generally
achieved either by prescribed fire, or by mechanical thinning. In a prescribed fire, the
forest understory is burnt under favorable conditions to remove surface and ladder fuels.
Under mechanical thinning, heavy equipment is used to remove trees from the stand to
reduce canopy density. Empirical evidence (reviewed in Kalies and Kent, 2016) indicates
that fuel reduction projects within dry forests in the western U.S. are effective in reducing
fire intensity, especially when prescribed fire and thinning are used in conjunction.
There is also some evidence that strategically-placed fuels projects can help pre-
vent damage to homes and structures. During the 2011 Wallow Fire in Arizona, fuels
projects placed adjacent to a residential area resulted in reduced fire severity (Kennedy
and Johnson, 2014), and have been credited with saving homes by providing firefighters
with opportunities to them (Bostwick et al., 2011). Unfortunately, while federal spending
on fuels projects has increased over the past several decades, federal agencies are bud-
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get constrained, and they cannot implement fuels projects everywhere they are needed.
Therefore, federal agencies may face competition among residential areas for their limited
resources.
While scientific management is a foundational doctrine of the USFS, previous re-
search indicates that USFS and other federal land management agencies decision-making
is frequently influenced by public pressure (Sabatier et al., 1995; Johnson and Watts,
1989). This may in part be due to the participatory decision-making structures that
have defined federal land management planning since the passage of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970. NEPA mandates that all federal agencies must
document actions that will significantly impact the environment with an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS). Further, it mandates a public comment period during which the
public can comment on the proposed action. Similarly, the National Forest Management
Act of 1976 mandates that the public be allowed opportunities to comment on forest
management plans. This openness to public input likely affects the fuel project planning
process. According to Hakanson (2010), forest managers often have an eye toward the
NEPA process from a fuel projects conception.
In chapter 3, we investigate how, when agencies are responding to public pressure,
behavioral biases such as salience can lead them to make inefficient decisions. Salience is
a behavioral phenomenon in which individuals’ disproportionately weight concerns that
have drawn their attention (Taylor and Thompson, 1982). Salience frequently distorts
human responses to natural disasters, and can lead to inefficient or potentially even
maladaptive responses to these events (Anderson et al., 2018). Prices of homes in areas
of high fire or flood risk are lower than homes outside these areas, but only in years after
a fire or flood has occurred nearby (McCoy and Walsh, 2014; Bin and Landry, 2013).
Corporate managers increase cash holdings after hurricane events, despite the fact that
the hurricane event did not alter the base level of risk (Dessaint and Matray, 2017). In
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the political science literature, salient disaster events are referred to as focusing events,
and have been shown to influence political agenda-setting (Birkland, 1997). In chapter 3,
we found that federal wildfire fuels management projects are more likely to be placed near
communities that have experienced recent wildfires. We attribute this pattern to salience
of wildfire risk in these areas, and the ensuing public pressure community members place
on agencies. Here, we use the occurrence of wildfires as a shock to public pressure, and
use this to identify differential rates of bureaucratic responsiveness across demographic
groups.
4.3 Methods
Our units of observation in this paper are U.S. Census blocks from 15 western U.S.
states.1 We focus specifically on blocks on classified as wildland urban interface (WUI)
in 2000, since these are communities that are likely to face wildfire risk. Because we
are interested in determinants of public fuel management project locations, we further
limit our sample of Census blocks to those within 10 km of public lands managed by
the US Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), or National Park
Service (NPS). The USFS, BLM, and NPS together manage approximately 1.5 million
square kilometers of land in the western U.S., and are responsible for 93% of federal fuels
management projects within the timespan of our data. After these restrictions, our data
comprises more than 320 thousand census blocks.
Data regarding fuel treatment locations come from the National Fire Plan Operations
and Reporting System (NFPORS). Our NFPORS data set records the point location
(latitude and longitude), dates, and area of all fuels reduction projects conducted by the
1The states comprise US Forest Service regions 1-6. They are Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for dependent variables
Dep. vars. measuring fuel projects
near WUI block
Radius Indicator
Percent
public land
Total area
(sq. km)
2 kilometers .027 .0064 .065
5 kilometers .074 .0093 .3
10 kilometers .16 .011 1.1
Number of WUI blocks 322,683 322,683 322,683
Number of block-year obs. 5,035,247 5,485,611 1,942,522
USFS, BLM, and NPS during years 2003-2011. Since NFPORS does not provide fuels
project boundaries, we used reported point locations and project areas to impute project
boundaries, under the assumption that project boundaries are circular. We compare
variation across WUI blocks in the degree to which fuels project are placed nearby, and
we measure fuels projects three ways. First, we use as a dependent variable an indicator
for whether any fuels projects were placed within a given distance of a WUI block in a
given year. As two additional dependent variables, we measure the percentage and total
area of public lands that were treated within some distance of a WUI block in each year.
Average values of each of the three dependent variables are provided in Table 4.1, where
the table’s rows vary in the radius around each WUI block within which fuels projects
are measured.
Data on the occurrence of fires are drawn from the USGS Monitoring Trends in Burn
Severity (MTBS) project, which uses satellite remote sensing data to map all large fires
occurring within the U.S. Within the western U.S., MTBS maps all fires larger than
1,000 acres. Therefore, while the MTBS data do not include all fires within the period,
they include the largest and therefore likely the most salient wildfires. We measure
the distance from each census block to the nearest wildfire in each year over the years
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Table 4.2: Rate at which WUI blocks received nearby fuel treatments, for full sample
and for WUI block-years in which a recent nearby fire has occurred
Block-years with recent fire within distance
Full
sample
2 kilometers 5 kilometers 10 kilometers
Distance from WUI block
2 km 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.05
108,734 8,856 17,227 29,397
5 km 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.12
335,994 21,263 46,279 86,706
10 km 0.16 0.29 0.24 0.22
781,638 47,369 103,243 200,343
Number of WUI blocks 322,683 39,303 85,128 144,934
Number of block-year obs. 5,035,247 160,911 427,669 914,102
2000-2011, and we define the indicator recentfireit as equal to one for blocks that have
experienced a wildfire within some threshold distance in the past 3 years. Columns 2-4
of Table 4.2 report fuels project rates after the sample has been limited to those blocks
for which a fire has occurred within 2, 5, and 10 kilometers, respectively. Comparing fuel
projects rates in these columns with column 1 of Table 4.2, which reports the percent
of sample overall receiving treatments within a given radius, blocks are more likely to
receive a fuels project when they have experienced a recent nearby fire.
We hypothesize that the observed increase in fuels project rates may be due to height-
ened salience of wildfire risk in these areas. Where wildfire risk is more salient, home-
owners and community members may apply greater pressure on public land management
agencies to reduce wildfire hazard. However, while the pattern of fuels project rates
observed in Table 4.2 is consistent with this hypothesis, there are other explanations as
well. Areas with higher wildfire risk are more likely to have experienced recent wildfires,
and are more likely to be chosen as the location for fuels reduction projects. To separate
the effect of a recent wildfire from the fixed wildfire risk within an area, we make use
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Table 4.3: Demographic and political characteristics for the entire sample of WUI
blocks, and for WUI blocks receiving nearby fuel reduction projects
Block-years with fuels projects within distance
Full sample 2 kilometers 5 kilometers 10 kilometers
Population density 1541.1 [4400.5] 684.2 1070.6 1282.4
Per cap. income 21365.9 [10205.8] 22241.0 21818.6 21479.3
Percent older than 65 13.3 [6.65] 13.6 13.7 13.5
Percent high school grad. 84.0 [10.0] 86.9 86.5 85.7
Percent college grad. 23.8 [14.7] 25.3 25.7 25.2
Percent white 83.9 [16.2] 90.6 89.5 88.0
Percent American Indian
and Alaska Native
3.20 [11.0] 1.99 1.96 2.10
Percent Hispanic or Latino 14.0 [16.9] 8.62 9.35 10.8
Number of WUI blocks 322,683 9,042 19,169 25,933
Number of block-year obs. 3,872,196 108,734 335,994 781,638
Note: Standard deviations are included within brackets.
of the panel structure of our block-level data set and include in our estimating equation
a full set of WUI block fixed effects. These effects account for fixed differences across
blocks in the rate at which projects are implemented on surrounding land.
Finally, we collected a series of variables describing each block’s demographic char-
acteristics. Demographic variables include a series of income, education, age, and race
and ethnicity variables measured at the Census tract level, as well as population density,
which is measured at the Census block level (US Census Bureau, 2000). Since our fuels
treatment data span the years 2003-2011, we use demographic variables from the 2000
Census, and therefore our demographic variables are not measured as time-varying. Col-
umn 1 of Table 4.3 reports the means and standard deviations of demographic variables
within our sample of WUI blocks. To ease interpretation of regression results, each demo-
graphic variable is standardized so that it is distributed with mean zero and a standard
deviation of 1.
Columns 2-4 of Table 4.3 report means of demographic variables within block-years
receiving fuel reduction projects within 2, 5, and 10 kilometers, respectively. Since de-
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mographic variables are not observed as time-varying, means for demographic variables
are means of demographic variables that ever received fuels projects within for example,
2 kilometers, weighted by how frequently they received fuels projects. Blocks for which
fuels projects occur more frequently nearby tend to be less dense, wealthier, and more
educated. Most significantly, when fuels projects occur within 2 km of WUI blocks, these
blocks are 90 percent white, while blocks within the sample overall are 83.6 percent white.
Patterns in demographic variables are largely consistent with our hypotheses. Wealth-
ier, whiter, and more educated Census blocks are more likely to receive fuels projects.
However, these patterns in and of themselves should not be interpreted as evidence that
managers are more responsive to such individuals. For example, these patterns could
also emerge due to amenity-driven sorting. Whiter, wealthier, and more educated indi-
viduals may be more likely to live in high amenity, high fire risk areas, and these areas
are likely to be chosen as the location for fuels reduction projects. To identify differences
in responsiveness to demographics, we make use of the occurrence of fires, which after
accounting for fixed differences across salience of wildfire risk within an area provide a
plausibly exogenous shock to public demand for fuels projects.
Formally, we model dependent variables yit, which each measure the placement of
fuel projects in the area surrounding block i in year t, using a standard difference-in-
differences framework. We take WUI blocks as treated if they have experienced a nearby
wildfire in the past three years. We choose three years as the relevant cut-off because our
work in chapter 3 indicates that salience of wildfire events is short-lived, and does not
drive fuel project decision-making after about 3 years.2 We define nearby fires as those
occurring within 2 km of a WUI block, since we believe very nearby fires will be most
salient to homeowners and most likely to drive increases in public pressure. Therefore, we
2This finding is also consistent with other empirical work on the effects of salient disaster events on
home prices, eg. McCoy and Walsh (2014).
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define the variable recentfireit as equal to 1 if WUI block i experiences a wildfire within
2 km in the past three years and zero otherwise. We write the difference-in-difference
specification as:
yit = αi + βrecentfireit + recentfireit × x′iγ + δrt + εit. (4.1)
The coefficient β describes the main effect of a recent fire on the placement of fuels
projects. Because we are interested in how responsiveness to salient wildfire events
varies with demographics across communities, we allow the effect to vary with demo-
graphic characteristics. The degree to which the effect of wildfire occurrence varies with
demographic variables is captured by the K × 1 vector of parameters γ. Given that
demographic variables are standardized to a distribution with mean zero and a standard
deviation of 1, every element γk of γ can be interpreted as describing increases in re-
sponsiveness due to a 1 standard deviation increase in demographic variable k. In order
for β and γ to be identified, it is required that there exist no unobserved factors within
the error term εit that are correlated with the occurrence of a recent fire, and lead to an
increase in area receiving fuels projects near WUI block i. Due to amenity-driven sorting,
higher socioeconomic status individuals may be more likely to live in areas with higher
wildfire risk and higher fuels project rates (Stetler et al., 2010). To account for fixed
differences in the fuels project rates across blocks, we include block-level fixed effects αi.
Still, a threat to identification would exist if wildfire risk facing individual wild-
land urban interface blocks were to vary over time in a way that were correlated with
block demographic characteristics. To guard against this possibility, we include a set
of county-by-year fixed effects—denoted δrt, where r indexes counties—which account
for differences across counties and within years, in fuels project rates. After including
block and county-by-year fixed effects, we identify β and γ using variation in differences
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between departures from the the within county-by-year average fuel project rate for cell
i in year t, and the average departure from the within county-by-year fuel project rate
across all years for cell i.
Fuels project rates are spatially correlated, both due to underlying spatial correlation
in wildfire risk and mechanically due to the way in which our dependent variables are
constructed. Our dependent variables are defined as a function of the placement of
fuel projects within some distance from a given block. However, the same fuels project
may increase the project rates for multiple adjacent WUI blocks. Moreover, treatment
is not randomly assigned to blocks. It is spatially correlated, since a fire that occurs
near one block also occurs within the proximity of adjacent blocks. To account for non-
independence among observations within our sample of blocks, we cluster standard errors
by Census tract. Census tracts are generally quite large within the western U.S. Our
sample of nearly 5.5 million blocks, but contains only 5,470 tracts across 473 counties.
4.4 Results
We are interested in how bureaucratic responsiveness varies across different types of
communities. In particular, we are interested in how responsiveness varies with per capita
income, educational attainment, racial composition, and age. Unfortunately, within our
sample of WUI communities these variables are highly correlated. Figure 4.1 illustrates
joint distributions for demographic variables within the sample of WUI blocks. The
upper left panel, for example, indicates that blocks are most likely to have a very high
percentage of white residents and per capita income of approximately $20,000. Further,
it shows that very few blocks are observed to have a low percentage of white residents,
but a high per capita income. Similarly we do not observe blocks with high per capita
income but low levels of educational attainment, or blocks with a high percentage of
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Figure 4.1: Joint distribution of demographic variables within the sample of WUI
blocks. Observations above or below or the 97.5 or 2.5 percentiles, respectively, for
any demographic variable have been dropped from the sample.
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senior citizens but a low percentage of white residents.
The strong correlations among demographic variables within our sample makes it dif-
ficult to separately identify which variables bear primary responsibility for any differences
in responsiveness. Therefore, in Tables 4.4-4.6, we test the effect of demographic charac-
teristics on responses to wildfire events in two ways. First, in columns 1-5 of each table,
we test how responses vary with individual demographic characteristics. A disadvantage
of these results is that because demographic characteristics are highly correlated, it is
not possible to know for example whether differences in responses are due to differences
in education or differences in racial composition. In column 6, we include each of the
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demographic interactions together in the same regression. This model provides insights
into which of these demographic variables is most responsible for driving differences in
responsiveness across locations. However, because demographic variables are highly cor-
related with one another, interaction coefficients within this model are not estimated
with great precision.
Table 4.4 provides estimates of equation 4.1, where the dependent variable is an indi-
cator for whether any public lands within 2 km of WUI block i received fuel treatments
in year t. Therefore, the model can be interpreted as a linear probability model. The
coefficient reported in column 1 indicates that the probability a fuels project is placed
within 2 km is more than 2 percentage points higher for blocks that have experienced a
wildfire within 2 km in the past three years. Table 4.1 indicates that approximately 3
percent of blocks receive projects within 2 kilometers in a given year; therefore, recent
fires cause an approximately 75% increase in the probability a fuels project will be placed
nearby. This result is similar to the result reported in chapter 3. Columns 2 and 3 indi-
cate that the magnitude of this effect doubles when the percentage of white residents or
the percentage of high school graduates within a block increases by 1 standard deviation
(16 percentage points or 10 percentage points, respectively). The probablity of receiving
a project is approximately 1.2 percentage points higher for blocks with per capita income
that is 1 standard deviation above the mean; however, this difference is not statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. Finally, blocks with a one standard deviation higher
percentage of senior citizens are 1.2 percentage points less likely than average to receive
nearby fuels projects after the occurrence of a fire. When these variables are included
together in the same regression, standard errors increase due to high correlation among
demographic variables. Nonetheless, the regression estimates indicate that whiter and
younger blocks are more likely to receive fuels projects in the wake of a wildfire event.
Interestingly, variation in per capita income does not appear to be a primary driver of re-
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Table 4.4: Linear probability model of the probability a fuels project is undertaken
within 2 km of a WUI block, as a function of indicator for whether fire has occurred
within 2 km of the WUI block in the past 3 years and community characteristics
interacted with the indicator. The sample is limited to WUI blocks with at least one
public lands grid cell within 2 km.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire within 2 km .022* .021* .02* .021* .02* .018*
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Interactions with nearby fire
Pct. white .02** .017**
[0.01] [0.01]
Pct. high school grad. .023* .011
[0.01] [0.01]
Per cap. income .012 .0015
[0.01] [0.01]
Pct. older than 65 -.012* -.014**
[0.01] [0.01]
Block fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number obs. 4043671 4043671 4043535 4043671 4043671 4043535
Number of WUI blocks 237,863 237,863 237,855 237,863 237,863 237,855
Number of county-years 7,837 7,837 7,837 7,837 7,837 7,837
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by Census tract, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05.
sponsiveness. This finding differs from much of the literature on inequality in government
responsiveness (Gilens, 2005; McCarty et al., 2009; Gilens, 2011).
Table 4.4 captures differences in the extent to which blocks are treated, but may
underestimate differences in responsiveness if managers are not only more likely to im-
plement projects but are also more likely to implement larger projects around certain
types of blocks. In Table 4.5 we use as the dependent variable the percentage public
lands within 2 kilometers on which fuels projects are implemented, and we report results
from the same set of regressions as in Table 4.4. Occurrence of fire near a WUI block
increases the percentage area receiving projects by about 0.8 percent, where on average
0.6% of public lands within 2 km of a WUI block receive fuels projects in a given year
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(Table 4.1). This effect varies with demographic variables similarly to the effect observed
in the previous table. One concern is that there may be greater capacity for respon-
siveness to blocks that are near large areas of public lands, and that these blocks may
be more likely to have low diversity and high per capita income. To examine whether
dividing area with fuels projects by total area of public lands biases our results, in Ta-
ble 4.6 we again perform the same set of regressions, but use area receiving fuels projects
within 2 kilometers as the dependent variable. Results are consistent with the previous
regressions. The average block receives 0.065 square kilometers of fuel projects within 2
kilometers in a given year. When a fire has occured near a WUI block in the previous
three years, the block receives 0.26 square kilometers in additional fuel projects. This
effect tends to increase as the block becomes less diverse and younger.
4.5 Discussion
In this paper, we find that forest managers are more likely to implement fuels projects
near communities that have recently experienced a fire, especially if those communities
have a higher percentage of white or young residents. The literature on government
responsiveness and inequality tends to focus on variation in responsiveness across levels
of per capita income. In general, it does not explore whether other demographic char-
acteristics, which may be correlated with per capita income, instead drive differences in
responsiveness. Our results suggest that demographic characteristics such as race and
age may be important in explaining differences in responsiveness. In contrast to much
of the literature on inequality in government responsiveness, we find no relationship be-
tween responsiveness and community per capita income, even when per capita income
is included in regressions as the sole demographic interaction. It is possible that we fail
to observe an effect of income on responsiveness because government bureaucrats face a
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Table 4.5: Regression of the percent of public lands within 2 km of a WUI block
receiving a fuel project on an indicator for whether fire has occurred within 2 km of
the WUI block in the past 3 years and community characteristics interacted with the
indicator. The sample is limited to WUI blocks with at least one public lands grid
cell within 2 km.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire within 2 km .0078* .0075* .007* .0075* .0073* .0065*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Interactions with nearby fire
Pct. white .0081** .0068**
[0.00] [0.00]
Pct. high school grad. .0088* .0042
[0.00] [0.00]
Per cap. income .0049 .00089
[0.00] [0.00]
Pct. older than 65 -.0039* -.0044*
[0.00] [0.00]
Block fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number obs. 4043671 4043671 4043535 4043671 4043671 4043535
Number of WUI blocks 237,863 237,863 237,855 237,863 237,863 237,855
Number of county-years 7,837 7,837 7,837 7,837 7,837 7,837
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by Census tract, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05.
different set of incentives than do elected officials. While elected officials may be con-
cerned about pleasing voters more likely to donate to campaigns, bureaucrats may be
implicitly biased toward citizens with whom they are more similar. On the other hand,
it is possible that we observe no relationship between income and responsiveness simply
due to insufficient variation across blocks in per capita income. This explanation seems
especially likely since we find evidence that responsiveness is correlated with education
levels, and education is correlated with income.
An important limitation to this paper is that because we have no direct measure of
citizen political engagement, we cannot discern whether differences across communities
in fuel project rates after fires are due to differences in salience-motivated political action,
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Table 4.6: Regression of fuel project area within 2 km of a WUI block on an indicator
for whether fire has occurred within 2 km of the WUI block in the past 3 years and
community characteristics interacted with the indicator. The sample is limited to
WUI blocks with at least one public lands grid cell within 2 km.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire within 2 km .26* .3* .23* .24* .27* .33**
[0.11] [0.12] [0.10] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12]
Interactions with nearby fire
Pct. white .31* .38**
[0.13] [0.14]
Pct. high school grad. .21 .058
[0.11] [0.10]
Per cap. income .061 -.061
[0.06] [0.05]
Pct. older than 65 -.13* -.2**
[0.05] [0.08]
Block fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number obs. 500,633 500,633 500,633 500,633 500,633 500,633
Number of WUI blocks 29,449 29,449 29,449 29,449 29,449 29,449
Number of county-years 850 850 850 850 850 850
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by Census tract, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05.
or to responsiveness per se. If the occurrence of a wildfire induces a uniform shock to
demands communities place on land management agencies, we would be able to interpret
differences in post-fire effects on project rates strictly to government responsiveness. It
is possible that, however, that in the wake of a wildfire event, certain communities are
more likely to become politically engaged and to comment on proposed fuels management
projects. If so, differences we observe in post-fire effects on project rates may be due to
differences across communities in shocks to demand induced by wildfires. Whether our
results are due to differences in responsiveness per se or differences in shocks to demand,
this paper shows that similar events can yield very different policy outcomes for different
types of communities. Further, it indicates inequality in government responsiveness ex-
tends beyond policymaking to the implementation of policy by government bureaucrats.
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